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M I L A N H O D Z A ' S E F F O R T S T O F E D E R A L I Z E 
C E N T R A L E U R O P E 
By Michal Múdry-Šebtk f 
Before his death Michal Múdry-Šebík prepared a study on the political regio-
nalism of Milan Hodža. That paper was planned to he directly connected with 
the following essay on federalist elements in Milan Hodza's politics. As both 
themes are so dosely connected and since there is Utile to be gained from Publish­
ing Müdry's unfinished outline, this introduction will try to summarize Mudry's 
opinions on Hodza's regionalism. 
One finds a good expression of Hodza's regionalism before the First World 
War in the political program for which he wanted, with the help of other non-
Hungarian politicians, to enlist the support of the designated successor to the 
throne, Franz Ferdinand. Múdry stressed that this program did not envisage any 
federalization of Hungary. Instead, the program allowed for a limited regional 
self-government of the different provinces. Franz Ferdinand, for his part, intended 
to limit the power of the Budapest government with the aid of non-Hungarian 
elements of the population which was then in Hungary. On the other side he did 
not agree with the kind of a nationalistic federalization which, for instance, was 
preached by many Czech politicians at that time. At the time of his so-called 
Belvedere Politics, Hodza's regionalism was closer to the ideas of the „memoran-
dists" from Turčiansky Sv. Martin and their concept of the „Area populated by 
the Slovaks" (Slovenské okolie), than to František Palacky's Austroslavism. 
In the first years of the Republic Hodža was usually taken, at least from the 
ideological point of view, for a supporter of the „Czechoslovak" camp. He him-
self added to this view by writing his book, The Czechoslovak Dissension (Česko­
slovenský rozkol). But Michal Múdry collected considerable materiál in support 
of his thesis that Hodza's policy even at that time had its regionalistic aspects. 
From the beginning Hodža not only approved the concept of a division of the 
country into „counties" (župy), but he even supported the idea of so-called 
„union of counties" (župné zväzy). In 1925—26" he fought for the self-govern­
ment of Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia and the Subcarpathian Ukraine. As prime 
minister in 1937, he was politically responsible for the government resolution of 
February 17 which gave a positive answer to some justified regionalistic demands 
of the German minority. In the spring of 1937, on Hodza's initiative, debates 
started on the possibility to give the so-called land presidents and the land Councils 
enlarged competences. The aim was not only to extend Slovák self-government 
but also to give gradually an autonomy to the Subcarpathian Ukraine, as had 
been stipulated by the peace treaty. In the summer of 1938 the political cabinet of 
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Hodza's government agreed on principles for a decentralized settlement of inter-
nal affaires which also forsaw a limited but definite legislative power of the land 
Councils. Hodza's quarreis with Beneš during the Second World War, which 
Michal Múdry himself witnessed on the side of Hodža, resulted mainly from 
their different evaluation of the legal character of this cabinet agreement. For 
Hodža it was a fundamental demand that the Czecho-Slovak Republic be rear-
ranged as a regionally decentralized State after the Second World War. 
But Hodža was always quite pragmatic in pursuing his political aims. That is 
why his regionalism took on various „colours" and changing tactical accents, 
all depending on his evaluation of the given political Situation. On the other side, 
Múdry asserts, regionalism always remained an integral element of Hodza's 
political philosophy. Múdry summarized his opinion in the following points: 
1. Regionalistic viewpoints seemed to have been of substantial consequence 
to everybody who was interested in politics in old Hungary. This was also the case 
in Czechoslovakia. But regionalism was mainly concerned with nationality and 
minority problems. Hodža, as far as he was concerned, found in regionalism 
also an answer to a number of generál problems of modem democracy. He stressed 
that centralistic tendencies can be found in all political Systems of the world; they 
are thus not only a product of the Budapest or Prague style of government. Of 
course he knew that it was necessary to fight those tendencies systematically be-
cause they „concentrate in a few hands the power to which all hands are stretched 
out in a democracy"'. According to Hodža centralism of any shade and convic-
tion is undemcoratic. Regionalism strives to limit it by means of a regionally struc-
tured right to také political decisions. 
Múdry understood this standpoint of Hodža as one of the key theses of the 
latter's political philosophy. In fact Hodža expressed the samé idea, R. Michels 
formulated as an „iron law of oligarchy". 
2. Michal Múdry presumed that in Hodza's understanding of democracy the 
regionalistic principle has a similar importance as democracy itself accords inter 
alia to the principles of universal suffrage, majority rule and the right to recall 
elected officials. Mudry's view on Hodža could be summarized by the follow-
ing — even if it is difficult to find direct applicable quotations in Hodza's publi-
cations: As regionalism completes the division of legislative, judicial and executive 
powers by means of regional decentralisation of political decisions in a democracy, 
it also extends the potential of direct democracy by allowing for the latitude that 
is necessary for the active participation of more Citizens in public affairs. It helps 
to make political power more humane and puts thus obstacles in the way of its 
psychological alienation. Regionalism strengthens the democratic recognition of 
the rights of various geographically defined minorities. It introduces new group 
of interests into the systém of checks and balances, by which democracy is defend-
ing itself against the omnipotent concentration of power in the hands of a limited 
number of people. 
3. According to Hodža, regionalism does not result only from the prerogatives 
of national independence. Compared to the Slovák autonomist Position, regiona-
lism is a more universal notion, both from the materiál, as well as from the poli-
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tical-geographic and socio-evolutionary point of view. Regionalism allows for 
füll political self-government in the legislative, the judicial and the executive 
domain, but it could also be applied only within the limits of partial self-government. 
As far as basic regional units are concerned, Hodža, in different periods of his 
political activity, focused his attention to the „lands" (Slovakia, Bohemia, Mora-
via, Silesia), the autonomous territory of Subcarpathian Ukraine, to the counties, 
„unions of counties" and „minority territories". In the end he tended to pre-
condition the practical application of this regionalistic principle on the existence 
of evolutionary factors, which explains why he branded premature demands for 
self-government as political radicalism and censured the unwillingness to modify 
the given political systém in step with the degree of social evolution as reactionary. 
4. In this connection Múdry emphasized the importance of the fact that though 
Hodža explicitly acknowledged the notion of the „national identity" (národná 
samobytnosť) of the Slovaks he nevěr deduced from this any consequences in the 
sphere of constitutional law (for instance, in the extreme case, the right to form an 
independent statě). Instead Hodža favored legislative action that could be passed 
without constitutional modifications. Hodza's attitude on the question of natio­
nal self-determination was quite flexible and pragmatic; he was, however, against 
the automatic claim of the right to form an independent statě simply on the basis 
of national particularity. He usually stressed in this context how small the Slovák 
nation was and reminded his adverseries of Slovakia's difficult geopolitical Situa­
tion in East Central Europe. Hodža took it for granted that in the future the 
Slovaks would join European Federation together with the Czechs. He thought 
that only with the Czechs could the Slovaks be strong enough to defend their own 
political and economic interests. 
The main theses of Múdry on Hodža could be summarized as follows: Hodza's 
regionalism is based on the practical recognition of the very samé democratic prin­
ciples in the vertical direction down to the smaller social units which — if extended in 
the opposite direction to bigger social units — are defined as federalism. In Hod­
za's way of thinking both the request of Slovák self-government in Czecho-Slo-
vakia and the demand for Czecho-Slovak self-government within the framework 
of a Middle-European Federation would be expression of regionalism. 
B. Štefánek 
In the area between Germany and Russia, bounded by the Baltic Sea ín the 
north and the Adriatic in the south, which in this study shall be called Central 
Europe, there is a great conglomeration of small and medium-sized nations. Power-
ful countries háve fought each other through the ages for power spheres in this 
area, sometimes for the complete domination of Central European countries. 
The tragédy of these countries, given the constant attempts of their big neigh-
bors to dominate them, has been their chronic disunity caused by old jealousies. 
The greatest tragédy perhaps was that after the Battle of Moháč (1526) the Czechs, 
the Slovaks, the Poles and the Magyars passed up a good opportunity to form a 
strong political union. Wehn they all came under the domination of Austria's 
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Habsburg dynasty, the Habsburgs perhaps could háve welded them into a perma­
nent geographic entity but unfortunately, in their scheme some of the nations were 
„more equal" than others, and the others did not see that a satisfactory Solution. 
For them, the only satisfactory Solution would háve been a federation. 
The first attempt Central European nations made at a federation was at Krem-
sier (Kroměříž) Constituent Assembly in 1849. A proposal was submitted there 
for an extensive autonomy of the individual nations of the Habsburg Empire. The 
Czech historian and politician František Palacký suggested that the Empire be 
divided into eight administrative regions of which one would have been the terri­
tory inhabited by the Czechs and Slovaks. That was the first proposal in modern 
history for Czech lands and Slovakia to be united and form a single political en­
tity *. But neither Emperor Francis Joseph I nor his ministers had any sympathy 
for such a proposal; nor did they understand what Palacký wrote to the German 
National Assembly at Frankfurt in his letter of April 11, 1848, in which he de-
clined the Assembly's invitation to represent the Czechs of Bohemia in the Assem­
bly: „Certainly, had not the Austrian State been here from way back, in the inter-
est of Europe, nay, of the whole mankind, wo would have to make haste to create 
o n e
2
. " And they also could have hardly understood Palacky's prophetic words 
in 1865 when he warned the imperial court against the conclusion of the Austrian-
Hungarian Ausgleich (settlement) of 1867: „We were here before Austria and we 
shall be here after ist." 
Another attempt at federalizing the nations of Austria-Hungary was the mon-
archy's reform plan which was being prepared by the heir apparent, Francis Ferdi­
nand, from 1906 to the time of his death in 1914 in Cooperation with the represen-
tatives of the Empire's non-Magyar nationalities. It now appears that had his 
plans materialized, the map of Europe would probably look quite different now. 
But on July 28, 1914, Francis Ferdinand was killed at Sarajevo by an assassin's 
bullet and his death dashed all hopes for an eventual restructuring of the Empire. 
1
 Thus constitutional union of these two nations was not inventcd just in 1918. 
2
 In this letter, the prophetic historian Palacký also says to the Frankfurt delegates: 
„You are no doubt aware that in the south-east of Europe, along the Russian border, 
there are many nations whose origins, languages, history, and customs differ mar-
velously from each other — Slavs, Romanians, Magyars, and Germans, — not to 
mention Greeks, Turks, and Scipetars, none of which nations by itself is strong enough 
to resist its all-powerful Russian neighbor with success for all future times. That they 
can do only if they are united and firmly tied to each other. The real lifeblood of 
this necessary union is the Danube; therefore, should it be a useful and a lasting one, 
its center must nevěr move too far from that river. When I thus gaze beyond the 
Czech border, reasons both natural and historical make my eyes turn not toward 
Frankfurt but toward Vienna to seek such a center capable, nay destined, to insure 
and protéct my nation's peace, liberty, and justice." 
It is noteworthy that more than half-a-century later the Slovák Milan Hodža thought 
in exactly the same terms as the Czech historian Palacký and that he, too, envisioned 
a „necessary union" of nations with the Danube river as its „real lifeblood" as one that 
would be able to „resist the all-powerful neighbor with success for all future times". 
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It was an Hungarian State holiday, March 15,1894, and at the Šopronhigh school 
(gymnasium) all students sang in unison Isten áld meg, the Hungarian anthem. All 
but one: a tall youth with a crew-cut. He remained silent. He was watched with 
disapproval by his teachers and his fellow-students. Who was this „traitor"? He 
was a sixth-grader named Milan Hodža. 
Hodža was destined to play an important part in some of the efforts to estab-
lish a viable Central European federation. He was also destined to get into more 
than one confrontation with the authorities of Austria-Hungary and, as a result, 
often to land in jail. But this time he still got off rather lightly. He happened to 
be an excellent student, a first rate editor of the student páper Gyorsíró Lapok 
and, moreover, the first-prize winner in a national Hungarian shorthand compe-
tition. But by refusing to sing the anthem he had committed a „crime" which in 
Hungary of that time was not easily forgiven. And so his punishment was consi-
lium abeundi 3. 
As a result, he was forced to enter the seventh grade in a German gymnasium at 
Sibiu (Hermannstadt) in Transylvania. That, however, turned out to be a godsend 
for the subsequent Cooperation of non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary. In his 
new school he found some very good friends among the Germans, the Romanians, 
and the Serbs. And out of these friendships later on grew his Cooperation with 
non-Magyar democratic elements among Hungary's ethnic groups with whom he 
made a common struggle for the democratization of Hungary. 
When Hodža later entered the University of Budapest he found there some 
of his former Romanian and Serbian fellow-students and together with Michael 
Popovici and Ilario Chendi founded the Association of Ethnic Students. Its mem-
bers were Romanians, Serbs, and Slovaks and it further fostered Cooperation among 
non-Magyar nationalities. On October 6,1897, at the Suggestion of the barely 
nineteen-years-old Milan Hodža, the non-Magyar students issued a resolution in 
which they expressed the desire that „those who are at the heim of our oppressed 
nationalities, develop a common program of action, through which our oppressed 
nationalities could, as soon as possible, achieve an improvement of their Situation"4. 
Milan Hodža was not a dreamer even in his youth. He was already then a 
practical politician. This was what the Situation of his Slovák people looked like 
at the end of the last, and the beginning of the current Century: there were a few 
hundred intellectuals — potential leaders who, though, looked down on the com­
mon people or despaired of its economic and cultural level. They were headed by 
the good-natured Svetozar Hurban Vajansky 5 who in his patriotic enthusiasm 
3
 S. M i k u l a in her unpublished dissertation: Milan Hodža and the Slovák National 
Movement 1898—1918 (Syracuse University 1974), writes in part: „For this refusal 
he was punished but not expelled." — But the fact is that the consilium abeundi meant 
that after concluding the academie year the student was not allowed to return to the 
same school, and that he was, therefore, in fact expelled. 
4
 H o d ž a , Milan: Články, reci a štúdie [Articles, speeches and studies]. Vol. 1. Prague 
1930—1934, p. 4. 
5
 Svetozar Hurban Vajansky (1847—1917), son of Jozef Miloslav Hurban, who led the 
Slovák revolution against Kossuth in 1848; writer who expected salvation of the Slovák 
nation from Russia. 
101 
expected salvation of his people from „Batyushka" the Czar. And into this passive 
somnolence in Slovakia suddenly thundered the words: „If we Slovaks are to 
accomplish anything, we must rely on nobody and nothing, except our own work 
and brains!" Thus Milan Hodža introduced his own newspaper Slovenský 
Týždenník (Slovák Weekly) on July 4,1903. He wrote that Slovaks cannot 
dream of freedom to come from Slavic Russia, because — what kind of Slav Czar 
is it who keeps ten million Poles in prison ? 
Hodža aimed his journalistic activity, first of all, against Slovák passivity, at 
a national and political awakening of the masses of Slovák peasants, workers, and 
artisans, against magyarization and Magyar chauvinism, and against the aristo-
cracy which oppressed the nationalities and exploited the common man. In this 
struggle he found a common ground with the Social Democrats. He wrote: 
„It goes without saying that if the socialists have understood that we have the 
samé interests, then we, too, must understand it. All of us together form one camp, 
the camp of the poor. It is necessary that the callous hand of the peasant join the 
hard palm of the worker in a single fist aimed at our common enemy 6 . " 
For his journalistic activity, Hodža was frequently sent to prison and heavily 
fined. Thus he lost all the property and money he had inherited from his mother 
and his uncle. But it was not for nothing. The eyes of the Slovák people were open-
ed. And what they saw, among other things, was Milan Hodža as a potential 
leader of the national awakening. In the 1905 elections, they elected the barely 
27-years-old Hodža as their deputy from the Kulpin District (near Nový Sad) 
in the Hungarian Parliament. A year later, seven deputies of Slovák nationality 
were elected to the Parliament, among them once again Milan H o d ž a 7 . 
The Romanians then had fifteen deputies in the Parliament, and the Serbs four. 
Together with forty Croatian deputies, this was a sizeable Opposition faction, the 
total number of the Hungarian Parliament then being 450. The 26 Slovák, Roma-
nian, and Serb deputies voted to form a parliamentary club. And the hard-working 
Hodža became its secretary. 
The club was to become a respected Opposition group. It was soon noticed by the 
Belvedere, the seat of the heir apparent Francis Ferdinand. Francis Ferdinand 
disliked certain strata of the Hungarian gentry for their Separatist tendencies. He 
6
 Slovenský týždenník [Slovák Weekly] 4 (1906) No. 18 of May 4. — P e r o u t k a , 
Ferdinand: Budování státu [Building the State]. Vol. 1. Prague 1933, p. 395, states: 
„It was feasible to find even some traits, which connected Hodža then with marxism." 
— But Hodža nevěr was a marxist — he was a populist! 
7
 Slovenský týždenník helped a lot at the election. At that time it was being published 
in more than 14,000 copies. Later on it surpassed this figuře by far. 
The Kulpin district was in Bachka in southern Hungary (present province of Vojvodina 
in Yugoslavia) and Hodža was elected there with the aid of Serb votes. — S. M i k u l a 
in her dissertation about Hodža was in error when she said in footnote 25, on page 68, 
that: „The first and second Slovák members of the parliament Ludovít Štúr, 1847—48, 
and Paulíny-Tóth, 1869, have been elected from there." — Ludovít Štúr was an 
Ablegat — an appointed member of the Diet for the city of Zvolen (See: O s u s k ý , 
Samuel Š.: Filozofia Štúrovcov [Štúr's Philosophy]. Myjava 1926, p. 65, and J a n ­
š á k , Štefan: Slovensko v Době Uhorskcho Feudalizmu [Slovakia in the Era of Hun­
garian Feudalism]. Bratislava 1932, p. 138, etc.). 
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considered his uncle Francis Joseph's settlement with the Hungarians of 1867 a 
catastrophy for the unity of the Empire. He was impressed by the work of the 
Romanian political writer Aurel Popovici Die vereinigten Staaten von Groß-
Österreich, published in 1906, in which — as indicated by the title — the author 
proposed the reorganization of the Empire into a sort of „United States" of 
Austria, composed of many nationalities 8. Francis Ferdinand assembled around 
himself a few enlightened politicians and statesmen, at first only from the German 
circles and from that Catholic Hungarian gentry which was attached to the mon­
archy. Among them was Austrian-German Social Democratic politician Karl Ren­
ner, who had caused a stir under the assumed name of Rudolph Springer already 
before Popovici's book with his study Der Kampf der österreichischen Nationen 
um den Staat (Struggle of the Austrian Nations about the State). It was a comprehen-
sive study which proposed changing the Habsburg Empire into a „Commonwealth 
of national self-governments" 9. Among others who followed Popovici and Social 
Democrat Renner, was the Social Democrat Dr. Otto Bauer, whose Die Nationali­
tätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie (Racial Problem and Social Democracy) 
offered an interesting interpretation of the marxist view of this problém. Renner 
and Bauer based their views on the Congress of the Social Democratic Party, held 
in 1899 in Brunn, whose resolutions concerning a fair settlement of conditions of 
the nationalities in the Empire were also accepted and signed by the Austrian 
Socialist Par ty 1 0 . 
Although Francis Ferdinand carefully followed these developments, and all 
reform efforts, royal blood had not ceased flowing in his veins. For a rather long 
time, he kept at a distance the reformists who saw a possibility of improvement in 
Hungary solely in such reforms as universal suffrage, or a land reform. However, 
it appears that his resentment of the Separatist Hungarian ruling nobility was even 
greater than his dislike of these reforms. He saw Hungarian separatism as enemy 
number one of the unity of the monarchy. Francis Ferdinand found Popovici, and 
those who had formed the Opposition club in the Budapest parliament, to his liking. 
Not because he was particularly sympathetic to the Romanians, Serbs, or Slovaks, 
but because „those boys" had more courage to stand up against the haughty Ma-
gyars than his uncle, Emperor and King Francis Joseph. What they had said pleased 
him immensely and it suited him fine. 
After Popovici's study came a parliamentary speech of the Romanian deputy 
Dr. Vaida-Voivod. Hodža and Vaida were spokesmen for the club of non-Magyar 
deputies, and the club authorized Vaida to deliver the speech during a debatě on 
the military budget. Vaida was an accomplished speaker and when on February 5, 
8
 According to the 1910 census, the non-Magyar nationalities represented 52 %> of the 
population in Hungary (including Croatia), and the Magyars 48 "/o — and these were 
the figures of official Hungarian statistics which tended to favor the Magyars. 
9
 Karl Renner was considered the best political brain in Austria in the years 1905— 
1908. After World War I, he became Austria's first Chancellor and again after World 
War IL 
1 0
 Regarding Renner's Cooperation with Hodža see R e n n e r ' s article in: Milan Hodža, 
publicista, politik, vědecký pracovník [Milan Hodža, Publicist, Politician, Scientific 
Worker]. Prague 1930, pp. 573 f. 
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1907, he delivered his speech for the unity of the army and, most of all, against its 
magyarization in Hungary, he was met with the wrath of the whole House. Hun-
dreds of fists moved menacingly towards his face, but Vaida and the other Opposi­
tion members of parliament remained calm. Vaida's speech was heard as far as 
the Belvedere Paláce. Francis Ferdinand ordered his assistant, Major Alexander 
Brosch, to go to Budapest, where he was to give the Archduke's wärmest greetings 
to deputy Vaida and to telí him he had been granted an audience. This was the first 
breakthrough in the mental reservation of Francis Ferdinand against the „refor-
mists" of the minority club of nationalities in Budapest. H e received Vaida-Voivod 
with open arms and with such kindness that the whole Belvedere was surprised. 
After the conversation, Vaida asked the Archduke for an audience for the Slovák 
representative Milan Hodža and the German Edmund Steinacker (from the Banat). 
Shortly thereafter, Cornelius Popovici was likewise received at Belvedere. But 
Dr. Vaida did not stop urging the Archduke to receive also „that wise Slovák", 
Milan Hodža n . 
Hodža writes, it was rather difficult for him to get to see Francis Ferdinand 12. 
His personal friend and collaborator Vaida-Voivod aroused the Archduke's curio-
sity with what was closest to the heir apparent's heart — defending the unity of 
the Austrian army. And it had been a well thought-out move by the minority club 
to get the attention of the heir apparent. But how to interest him in what Milan 
Hodža preached? To interest him in universal suffrage, land reform, in a consti-
tutionally guaranteed democracy, and the equality of nationalities? This, indeed, 
was not too close to the Archduke's heart. Maybe still that equality of nationalities 
— the devil with it! — at least those haughty Magyars will get tamed a bit. But 
to have the heir apparent, who considered himself the first aristocrat in the realm, 
vote side by side with mere peasants and workers, to make even that part of the 
nobility which he still loved and protected pay taxes proportionately with the 
plebeians, and to deliver their lands into the hands of the peasants, that was far 
from the heart of the Archduke. And this was what the Slovák was preaching, 
whom Vaida-Voivod had recommended and had even called „wise". Moreover, 
this „wise" Slovák was only a 28-year old youth and, in addition to that, a Luthe-
ran! 
Francis Ferdinand reflected for a long time, and as late as autumn 1906, was 
not yet quite sure about universal suffrage. Major Alexander Brosch, chief of the 
military office of the heir apparent, who, according to non-Magyar politicians in 
Hungary belonged to the élite of the Austrian generál staff, was convinced that 
universal suffrage would diminish the aristocracy's influence in the political life 
of the country and bring about a reconstruction of the whole Empire together 
with the unification of the army. He, therefore, recommended to his Commander 
that he invite Milan Hodža to an audience as soon as possible. 
„Finally, after the mass murders in Černová," wrote Vaida-Voivod, „I re-
1 1
 Alexandra Vaida-Voivod: „There once were Milan Hodža and the Romanians" — 
quoted from: Milan Hodža, publicista 622—627. 
12
 H o d ž a , Milan: Federation in Central Europe: Reflections and Reminiscenses. Lon­
don 1942, pp. 40—42. 
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ceived a letter from aide-de-camp Brosch, who in the meantime had been promoted 
to the rank of colonel, asking me to telí Hodža that he was directed to appear at 
an audience before the heir apparent. Shortly thereafter, it was also the turn of 
Steinacker. Thus a small ,non-Magyar camarilla' was created and began operating 
around Francis Ferdinand, which was organized by himself. Hodža and I worked 
together until the death of Francis Ferdinand in good comradeship with almost all 
the nationalities1 3." 
After the unprecedented bestiality of the murders in Černová 14, Hodža sub-
mitted an interpellation in the parliament, directed at the Minister of the Interior. 
There followed a scene reminiscent of the one witnessed by members of the non-
Magyar club on the occasion of the speech of Vaida-Voivod concerning the mili-
tary budget. The Magyar deputies threatened Hodža, cursed, and wanted to 
attack him physically. And the Minister of Interior protested: „I am surprised 
deputy Hodža dared to submit such an interpellation in this matter!" 
This interpellation by Hodža — like the preceding speech of Vaida for a uni-
fied army — was also heard at the Belvedere. Francis Ferdinand immediately 
summoned Milan Hodža to an audience, so as to find out more about what had 
happened in Černová. Hodža asked his close friend Anton Štefánek to get 
detailed information about the crime in Černová and write a precise report on 
it for the heir apparent. Štefánek did so and Hodža submitted the report to 
Francis Ferdinand 1 5. Hodža indicated later that when Francis Ferdinand got the 
report, he exploded in anger at the atrocity of the Magyars. Hodža got three 
audiences with the Archduke in connection with the Černová affair. 
Hodza's correspondence with Francis Ferdinand was facilitated by major, 
later colonel, Alexander Brosch through whom the heir apparent invited Hodža 
to audiences. They were quite frequent and very cordial. Hodza's perhaps closest 
collaborator, Anton Štefánek, wrote, that „Milan Hodža enjoyed exceptional 
confidence and respect of the heir apparent" 16. Francis Ferdinand came to like 
Vaida in the book: Milan Hodža, publicista 624. 
Poor villagers in Černová, near the city Ružomberok, had built a church, with their 
own money, and did not want it to be consecrated by an unsympathetic priest. The 
district administrátor (Slúžny) ordered the gendarmes to shoot into the crowd. There 
were 9 dead immediately on the spot, three poeple were dying, 13 heavily and 
80 lightly wounded. — See: B o 11 o , Julius: Slováci: Vývin ich národného povedomia 
[Slovaks: Evolution of their National Consciousness]. Vol. 2. Turčiansky Svatý Mar­
tin 1923, p. 140. 
Milan Hodža, publicista 106. 
D e d i j e r , Vladimir: Sarajevo 1914 (Translation by E. Čierna and J. Širácky, Epocha), 
p. 149: „The leader of the Slovaks — Milan Hodža was in continuous contact with 
Major Brosch and to a lesser extent with the Archduke. However, he did not submit 
memoranda about reforming the Monarchy, only informative-political reports about 
what the politicians were saying in parliamentary lobbies." 
This remark of Dedijer is more than tendentious when one considers Hodza's re-
lations with the Archduke, as described above on the basis of historical documents, 
and if one takés into consideration Hodza's own admission of how difficult it was for 
him to convince the Archduke of the necessity of universal suffrage. 
Rev. Andrej Hlinka's čase is a good evidence of Hodza's influence in Belvedere. Bishop 
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Hodža so much that he took into consideration his opinions about election reform 
in Hungary. Count Gyula Andrássy, Hungarian Minister of the Interior, also 
drafted an election reform bili. But his proposal was a mockery of all that in a 
democracy is considered universal suffrage. It guaranteed an absolute majority for 
the aristocracy and the Hungarian ruling class. Milan Hodža stated all his objec-
tions against Andrassy's proposals in a Memorandum he sent to Francis Ferdi­
nand. Thus, Hodža contributed to an open critique of Andrassy's proposals. 
Francis Ferdinand continued to refuse receiving Andrássy. He did receive him 
only at the direct order of his uncle, Emperor Francis Joseph. But Andrássy pro-
bably lived to regret that audience. The very next day, the heir apparent sum-
moned Hodža. He spoke to him openly, describing his ,audience' with An­
drássy which had lasted only a few minutes. „Please telí your friends", said the 
Archduke to Hodža, „that the audience was of no political significance at all. 
If it had been, the Count would not forget what i told him for the rest of his life . . . 
I am telling you, that fellow got out of here with a face as white as this cuff "." 
Hodža won the Archduke's trust to such an extent that he was eventually able 
to bring up also the potential usefulness for the heir apparent of establishing con-
tacts with the Czechs. Francis Ferdinand was particularly reluctant to admit the 
importance of a Cooperation with the democratic representatives of the Czech 
nation. He considered them to be „Hussite rebels" 1S, but it is interesting to notě 
that he did not find Hodza's own protestantism, and his family's protestant 
traditions, objectionable. „Why should I try to get on with Kramář, who thinks 
that he is going to bring about an Austro-Russian friendship? If that is going ever 
to happen, I myself will do it", Francis Ferdinand told Hodža. „I know Kramář. 
One minuté he behaves as if he were the foreign minister of Austria and the next 
as if he were the foreign minister of Russia. If I wish to see the Czechs, I have only 
to send for my brother-in-law 1 9 ." 
Hodža thought the Archduke's attitude a mistake. He found it hard to under-
stand why the heir apparent was willing to work on the reform of the Empire 
with even some of the radical elements — such as Hodža himself— and with the 
Austrian Socialists while he was unwilling to seek support from democrats in 
Bohemia which, as far as democracy was concerned, was the most progressive part 
of the Empire. Instead, the Archduke spoke of sending for his brother-in-law, 
meaning the aristocracy. But the aristocracy was of almost no importance any more 
as a viable social class in Bohemia and Moravia. By that time Hodža himself was 
Sándor Párvy (1848—1919) suspended priest Andrej Hlinka (1864—1938), a great 
Slovák patriot, from his office. At his audiences, Hodža asked the Archduke to in-
tervene on behalf of Hlinka, who was suspended only because of political reasons. He 
asked Francis Ferdinand to write directly to the Pope. This he did, and only as a 
result of that direct intervention Hlinka won his dispute with bishop Párvy. It is 
certainly a unique čase in the history of the Roman Catholic Church that the Pope 
intervened in favor of a priest against a bishop. This was Hodza's great achievement. 
1 7
 Hodža: Federation in Central Europe 46. 
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 I b i d e m 45. 
1 9
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already in touch with a number of Czech politicians and wrote for Czech news-
papers. 
Ferdinanďs contemplated reforms were probably the last chance the Habsburgs 
had to savé themselves and the Empire. The transformation of Austria-Hungary 
into a federation could at that time have meant the beginning of a peaceful evolu-
tion of a Central European Community of nations. When later in Sarajevo Francis 
Ferdinand was shot dead, it was clear to those knowledgeable of conditions in the 
monarchy that this meant the end. Mrs. Irena Hodža (Milan's wife), while re-
miniscing about her husbanďs Cooperation with the Archduke, told me Hodza's 
immediate reaction was: „This means war. The rotten Austria-Hungary will fall 
apart and we must build ,a Commonwealth of liberated nations' on its ruins 2 0." 
* 
Some students of Hodza's relations with the heir apparent ask themselves 
what actually Hodža hoped to accomplish with the help of the Archduke for the 
economic, political and social betterment of Slovakia? Francis Ferdinand was, 
after all, no democrat. And Milan Hodža knew it. He said and wrote it often 
enough. Was he then a dreamer? Was he being unrealistic? As evidenced by his 
whole political career, Hodža was more of a realist than any other Slovák politi-
cian of his time. 
Then how as a realist, could he have expected any thorough-going reforms of the 
monarchy from the Emperor's successor? Could he, as a realist, bélieve that „uni­
versal manhood suffrage, implemented in order to provide a more powerful, 
authoritative government" 2 1 might help to democratize Hungary? There are 
two answers to this question. 
1. Hodža saw the greatest evil of the Empire in its „dualism". How the 
Magyars in the Hungarian part of the Empire treated the non-Magyar nationali­
ties was of no concern to the Austrian half. They could do as they pleased. Hodža 
fought this dualism in his Speeches and articles long before he got the opportunity 
to discuss it with Francis Ferdinand. A revision of this dualist structure of the 
Empire became a political program, not proclaimed publicly by Hodža and his 
Romanian friends, but nevertheless one they were steadily working for. It is true 
that Hodža, while persuading Francis Ferdinand of the need for a universal 
suffrage also ušed the argument that it would diminish the political power of the 
Separatist Hungarian aristocracy and increase the central power of the monarchy. 
But that does not mean that he — a wholehearted democrat — wanted to make 
Austria safe for absolute monarchy. The abolishing of dualism would bring on also 
closer contacts with Czechs. 
2 0
 M ú d r y , Michal: Milan Hodža v Amerike [Milan Hodža in America]. Chicago 
1949, p. 219. 
2 1
 S. Mikula may have not thoroughly analysed Hodza's intentions when she wrote in her 
dissertation (p. 133): „It was not realistic to expect that social and economic reform 
would have followed from Francis Ferdinanďs plan. Universal manhood suffrage 
implemented in order to provide a more powerful, authoritative central government 
was hardly democratic reform." 
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2. In his view, it was necessary to try to get universal suffrage from the heir 
apparent even at the price of temporarily strengthening the central power of the 
monarchy. In the end, though, he reasoned, the universal suffrage was bound to 
lead to a universal democratization and to social reforms which in developed 
countries are borught about by evolution and in the backward ones by revolution. 
Whenever Hodža went to the Belvedere, he discarded any appearance of the 
radical and put on a mantle of moderation in the belief that during the course of 
history even the most rigid monarchies were in time forced to accept democracy 
up to its füllest political, economic and social consequences. Therefore, if Francis 
Ferdinand had in mind federalizing the Empire, then for the Slovaks the division 
itself would mean a loosening of their chains. And the principle that all the powers 
of the government are derived from the people, rooted in universal suffrage, in 
the end would lead to a universal democracy. If Hodža was talking about a strong 
monarchy, he was thinking about it as about a strong Opponent of the magyarizing 
ruling class; otherwise he would not have fought during his whole life against 
centralism and for regionalism, declaring that „centralism concentrates in a few 
hands the power for which all hands are justly reaching in a democracy" 22. 
After all, a federal systém itself is anticentralist. If the heir apparent really thought 
about a federation, then an effort for it had to be made28 . 
Hodža was too sobre a politician not to know that Francis Ferdinand, — despite 
listening to, and studying, the most diverse proposals for rebuilding the Empire — 
was not a democrat. We have already mentioned how long Francis Ferdinand 
agonized about universal suffrage and what a difficult task Hodža had to ex-
plain to him the importance of this basic democratic right for the democratization 
of the realm. Hodža, when it was necessary, did not hesitate to say harsh, threaten-
ing words even at the Belvedere. 
During the Balkan wars (1912—1913), oppressed Macedonia broke away from 
Turkey. „Bad times are falling upon Macedonia . . . For some time, the Macedo-
nians have been breaking away from their oppressors . . . Turkish Macedonia has 
fallen, now only Hungarian Macedonia Stands" 24, wrote Hodža; and, in even 
stronger words: „Nations are impatient, and they can rise just as they did against 
the Turkish empire — but if there should be struggle, let it be struggle and no 
empty words. Let us then conduct politics after the Balkan model: if in Vienna 
they don't understand our gentle Slovák, let us talk SerbianZ5." 
Such truly revolutionary and militant words were not for Francis Ferdinand 
who was terrified by what had happened in the Balkans, and who was probably 
surprised by what Hodža had written, the sensible Hodža! Yes, Hodža alterna-
22
 M ú d r y : Milan Hodža 102. 
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 In a speech delivered in Detroit, Mich., on May 17, 1942, in which — while reporting 
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ted moderation with radicalism. When Vienna was willing to introduce reform, 
Hodža made constructive proposals, but when they forgot about reforms and 
promises or kept postponing things indefinitely, his radicalism came to the fóre. 
As in this instance. But the Magyar Courts understood Hodza's „gentle Slovák" 
and sentenced Hodža for it — and for the two articles in which he had urged the 
Slovák children go to Czech schools — because Magyars did not permit any Slovák 
schools — to eight months in a statě prison and one month in a municipal prison 2 e 
(These sentences were increased after appeal during the war to 18 months). 
We may call Hodza's caucus with the Romanians and the Serbs in Budapest 
the Smaller Entente. In the Hungarian parliament it was the only center of the 
national idea, democratism, and social progress. Historical evolution carried it 
right into that ideological current which later stirred up Europe in World War I 
and dominated international politics in Central Europe. The Slovaks in Budapest 
were close to the Czech representatives at the Imperial Council in Vienna, the 
Croatian-Serbian coalition provided a certain link with Belgrade, and the then 
Romanian Consul General in Budapest Derussi, who became Minister of foreign 
Affairs after the war, cleared the way to Bucharest. During the war it was even 
more necessary for the representatives of various nationalities to meet in person 
at times. That was doně in Vienna. There, Conferences were attended also by 
Vaida-Voivod, and sometimes even by first lieutenant of the artillery Iuliu Maniu. 
At the beginning of 1917, Emperor Charles started efforts for a closer relation-
ship with Paris. Hodža and Vaida were one day directed to appear at an audience 
with the Emperor. Both were in military uniform. They knew what it meant — 
what consequences would be ascribed to it not only at home but especially abroad. 
Hodža and Vaida let it be understood that as soldiers they would obey Orders, 
but they could not speak for or represent any political parties or factions. The 
audience did not také place. But at the beginning of 1918, president Wilson's 
Fourteen Points alarmed the government in Vienna, and once more it tried to have 
Hodža and his Romanian confrěres issue a declaration that would have disavowed 
the actions of their compatriots abroad on behalf of their nations' freedom and 
which would have asserted the non-Magyar and non-German nationalities of 
Hüngary expected a just Solution of their disagreements with the monarchy within 
the framework of the Empire. But the representatives of the Romanian-Slovak 
caucus refused to do so. And so it can be justly said this was where the Little En­
tente was beginning to hatch, out of the shared political successes, defeats, and 
humiliatipns of the pre-World War I epoch, though legally the Little Entente be­
came a reality only well after the war. 
The big powers' struggle for spheres of influence in Central Europe (that is 
Mikula, on page 111 of her study objectively and justly writes: „The facts must be 
established before analysis can be attempted. The lack of such a comprehensive survey 
has led to the perpetuation of some basic errors. As one example, a number of historians, 
František Vnuk among others, believed that Hodža was nevěr imprisoned under the 
Hungarian Kingdom, which error affectcd their evaluation of him." 
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roughly the territory once encompassed by Austria-Hungary), and the constant 
disputes among its nationalities, is one of the recurrent leitmotifs of modern Euro­
pean history. Responsible statesmen were for ever trying to find an answer to the 
difficult question: how to make the local peoples live in harmony with each other 
within the Empire — and if that was impossible, how to parcel the Empire into 
individual States? But if the Empire would be broken up, what direction then 
would the political development in the new Central European countries take? Whose 
influence would finally become preponderant in this strategically and economically 
important region? 
It is interesting to note that the solidarity and Cooperation of the leaders of the 
non-Magyar nationalities — even while many of them were in uniform and were 
being watched by the secret police — was very similar to that of those politicians 
who represented the samé nationalities in the West. Thus already in February 1916, 
T. G. Masaryk in a memorandum to French prime minister Aristide Briand recom­
mended a partial federalization of Central Europe: „ . . . an independent Bohemia 
with Poland and Greater Serbia 2 7 ." 
I don't want to anticipate some of the events to be discussed later, but I have to 
note right here that the American president Woodrow Wilson pondered these 
problems for a long time before deciding to opt for the dismemberment of the 
Austrian Empire and the establishment of a number of small countries on its for­
mer territory. He made the decision in May, 1918. 
On September 15, 1918, a large meeting took place in New York's Carnegie 
Hall, at which the main Speakers were Thomas G. Masaryk and Ignacy Paderewski. 
At this meeting the „Mid-European Democratic Union" was founded at the Sug­
gestion of prof. Herbert Adolphus Miller 2 8 by the leaders of Central European 
nationalities in the USA with the aim of coordinating their struggle for indepen-
dence during the war and for insuring the dosest possible Cooperation among their 
future countries after the war. For none of them would be strong enough to stand 
by itself. Their ideas quickly gained popularity and in no time at all, there was 
talk of a Central European federation. It seemed to have become one of the un-
official aims of the war. The meeting's slogan was „The will of the People of 
Austria-Hungary". 
On September 20, 1918, Wilson received the representatives of the Union at the 
White House. Their spokesman was the Union's chairman, T. G. Masaryk. He 
presented to Wilson a resolution which demanded dismemberment of the Austrian 
Empire and envisioned a possible federation of the liberated nations on the Em-
pire's former territory. Its author was prof. H. A. Miller who even attached a 
little map to it to show the American public exactly how the anticipated federation 
might look. 
This idea well accorded with Wilson's intention to „make Europe safe for 
democracy". And when October 23—26 of that year the representatives of the 
2 7
 P r c h l í k , Karel: Zahraniční odboj 1914—1918 bez legend [Resistance in Exile 
1914—1918 without Legends], p. 175. 
2 8
 Herbert Adolphus Miller was a professor of political science and sociology at Oberlin 
College in Ohio. 
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Mid-European Democratic Union met at a large festive gathering in the Indepen-
dence Hall in Philadelphia to sign a Declaration of Common Cause of Indepen­
dent Nations of Central Europe, its first signer was Masaryk. A highly pleased 
Wilson wrote to Masaryk that according to his opinion, the declaration was „ad-
mirable alike in substance and in temper", that he considered its principles and 
ideals to be his own, and that he would „deem it a privilege to cooperate in their 
realization" 2 9. 
Point 5 of the Declaration States: „That we believe our peoples, having kindred 
ideals and purposes, should coordinate their efforts to insure the liberties of their 
individual nations for the furtherance of their common welfare, provided such a 
union contributes to the peace and welfare of the world." And among other things, 
the Declaration emphasized: „It was difficult to defeat the German-Austrian 
autocracy and it will be no less difficult to establish a new way of life upon its 
patrimony." This makes it very clear what goal the Union had set for itself — 
a federation. 
It is interesting that when Masaryk was about to sign the Declaration, he dipped 
his pen in the inkwell — and then momentarily paused to think before he signed 
his name: it was as if he wondered, anticipated difficulties. And those were not 
slow in coming. That very November, Paderewski informed Masaryk the Poles 
would no longer cooperate with the Union due to the Ukrainians' occupation of 
Lwow and Przemysl; and two weeks later, Grškovič informed Masaryk Yugo-
slavia was also quitting because of its dispute with Italy over their Adriatic terri-
tories. And thus the tender roots of Mid-European federation began to wither 
right there, and the idea gradually faded away. 
As latě as 1909, even Thomas Masaryk hoped conditions in Austria-Hungary 
could eventually be settled to the satisfaction of all its nationalities 3 0. And the 
doctoral thesis of Eduard Beneš, written in Paris in 1908 under the title Le pro­
bléme autrichien et la question tcheque, was inspired by the samé hope. At that 
time Beneš was still unknown to the Czech public. It was his activity during the 
First World War that brought him to public attention as the secretary of the revo-
lutionary Organization Czecho-Slovak National Council in Paris, at a time when 
Milan Hodža was already a well-known Journalist and political figuře carrying 
on a spirituál struggle for democracy with the „ruling class" in the Hungarian 
Parliament where his life at times was literally threatened while he was delivering 
his speeches. 
Eduard Beneš was a teacher at commercial school until 1915 when he managed 
to leave for Switzerland. From there, he proceeded to Paris. In Paris he became 
acquainted with Milan Štefanik, a fortunate circumstance for Beneš since 
2 9
 Z e l e n k a L e r a n d o , Lev: Prohlášení nezávislosti čs. národa. Národní kalendář 
1928 [Declaration of Czechoslovak National Independence, National Calcndar 1928]. 
ČSA. pp. 18—71. — M a m a t e y , Victor: The United States and East-Central 
Europe. Princeton N.J. 1957, pp. 316—317, 342—343. 
3 0
 I b i d e m 17 f. 
111 
Štefanik, a Slovák, and a naturalized French citizen, enjoyed a considerable 
scientific reputation in France and had friends in its highest political circles. He 
provided an entrée into those circles for both T. G. Masaryk and Eduard Beneš 
(it was Štefanik who introduced Masaryk to Briand). Hodža, right after the 
outbreak of the war, had to report to his regiment at Trenčín from where he was 
taken at bayonet point by the Hungarian gendarmes before a military court in 
Pressburg3 1. 
The diplomatic successes which Beneš achieved during the war both with the 
help of Štefanik and on his own — he was a methodical man, paying meticulous 
attention to every last bureaucratic detail — gradually won him a reputation of a 
diplomat at home. T. G. Masaryk named him his Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
the Provisional Government in Paris. And so a paradoxical Situation developed 
later because, though E. Beneš was Foreign Minister, the head of the Czecho­
slovak delegation at the Peace Conference was Karel Kramář. But negotiations at 
Conferences were conducted by Dr. E. Beneš and sometimes also by Štefan Osu­
šky 3 2. 
Eduard Beneš was Foreign Minister of Czecho-Slovakia continually until De-
cember 1935, when he became president of the Republic. The nation believed it 
had found in him a diplomat of the Talleyrand class. Beneš liked to pride himself 
on his diplomatic successes especially in the League of Nations. Under the protec­
tion of Masaryk, he gained a reputation of being irreplaceable at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. And the ambitious and industrious Beneš also made a name for 
himself at the League of Nations. He was several times its president; in 1932 he was 
generál rapporteur at the Disarmament Conference; and in 1935, president of the 
Assembly of the League of Nations. He played an active part in the League's 
acceptance of the Geneva Protocol, a major breakthrough in European politics of 
The government in Budapest attempted to have Hodža tried for some of his pending 
journalistic offenses by a military court, and charged him with treason, but the alert 
defense proved that such trials did not belong before a military tribunál. Thus he 
avoided the military court, although the military -command sent him to Veszprém 
where there was not a single Slovák. Only after a year was he transferred to Vienna 
where he then frequently met with Czech representatives in the Imperiál Assembly, in 
špite of being constantly followed by Hungarian as well as Austrian detectives. 
Štefan Osuský (1889—1973), former attorney in Chicago, Illinois, was sent by the 
Slovák League, an Organization of American Slovaks which morally and materially 
supported the Czecho-Slovak action abroad, to seek out Masaryk. Because Osuský 
was well versed in the Magyar language, he spent a lot of time during the war in 
Geneva where he compiled reports from the Hungarian press and from other sources 
which he then sent to T. G. Masaryk in London. After the war he was for a certain 
period of time Czecho-Slovak envoy in London and then continually, until 1939, 
envoy in Paris. After Hitler's occupation of Czecho-Slovakia, Osuský refused to 
consign the Czecho-Slovak Embassy to Germans, and started to organize in Paris the 
second Czecho-Slovak foreign action, and concluded an agreement with the French 
government according to which Czechs and Slovaks abroad had the right to organize 
their own army. After the fall of France he came to England. For a period of time 
he worked there in Czecho-Slovak resistance, for a short time was even a member of 
the exile government, but he nevěr recognized Benes's leading role in the resistance. 
Like Hodža, Osuský too was against Benes's pro-Soviet orientation. 
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reconciliation with Germany. The Protocol was an ambitious attempt to secure 
international peace and justice by submitting all controversial issues for inter­
national arbitration. The League accepted the Protocol, but the only statě that 
ratified it was Czecho-Slovakia. After that failure German Foreign Minister 
Gustav Stresemann declared that Germany was prepared to guarantee, in the form 
of a Rhine Pact, the iňviolability of its western borders and also to conclude agree-
ments with its other neighbors. But Stresemann did not sign an agreement guaran-
teeing the borders of Czecho-Slovakia. That for farsighted political leaders, and 
especially for Milan Hodža, was a memento. He warned: 
„We must always také into consideration that there is coming into being in our 
neighborhood a huge 70-million imperial entity, whose cultural and economic pro-
duction surpasses the capability of the other European nations. In the face of that 
we can not be satisfied with taking care of only our local Czecho-Slovak affairs33." 
Hodža thus stressed Cooperation with all of Central Europe, both with Poland 
and the southern neighbors of Czecho-Slovakia; and at a meeting of agrarian stu­
dents in Prague he declared: „We generally tend to be a little cocky and look down 
on others. Do not think that we are the most progressive of all. Progress grows 
horizontally from west to east. But we must move closer to each other along a 
vertical axis, too, from north to south 3 4 ." 
Furthermore, Hodža recommended the „coming of the classes closer to each 
other" and the „narrowing of gaps between legal codes" of Central Europe. He 
pointed out: „Germany and Austria are doing the samé thing: they are mutually 
adjusting their legislation, their civil and criminal codes, adapting common prin­
ciples of their Communications, fiscal and cultural policies. Formally there is no 
Anschluss, yet it is being prepared . . . If we should one day be faced by such An-
schluss of Vienna to Berlin it would mean a two-third encirclement for us in Czecho-
Slovakia, and for Poland another moment of psychological uncertainty and dan-
ger. It would mean that we, the Poles, and other Slavs [note of the author: here 
Hodža meant Central European Slavs] would have let slip by the first twenty 
years after the war without creating conditions for Cooperation, for getting closer 
to each other and uniting our national forces3 5." 
And how did Hodža recommend Europe to be organized? He did not believe 
any kind of a pan-European federation to be feasible yet. For that there were still 
no preconditions. Europe as a whole was still not ripe for it. In Hodza's words: 
„First there has to be an organized Central Europe. I t will then arrange its rela-
tionship with Germany and the rest of Europe, and then with America 3 6 ." 
N o doubt Beneš, too, was not indifferent to Stresemann's attitude on the 
German-Czechoslovak border question. He, too, must have known the problém 
of the Sudeten Germans, with 70 million brethren right at the other side of the 
border, could one day become the most burning problém of his young country. 
„I believe that the Czech-German question is the most important one", president 
3 3
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T. G. Masaryk declared already in 1922 in his New Year message in which he also 
stressed the importance of a friendly coexistence with the Weimar Republic. Mind-
ful of the importance of the problém of the Sudeten Germans, Beneš strove for a 
closer relationship with representatives of Germany and was greatly relieved when 
Bernard von Bülow, who after Stresemann's death had become State Secretary 
of the German Foreign Ministry, formulated German revisionist demands without 
including a claim to the territories inhabitated by Germans in Bohemia, Mora-
via, and Silesia. According to the German-Czechoslovak arbitration treaty signed 
on October 16,1925 as part of the Locarno Pact, all controversies between the two 
states were to be settled by international arbitration 3 7. 
In September 1926, when Beneš was president of the League's Assembly, Ger­
many was accepted as a member and given a seat in the Council as well. This effort 
of Beneš to bring Germany into peaceful international Cooperation was not in-
spired by any pro-German sentiments on his part. He merely realized that Czecho-
Slovakia, by virtue of its geographic position, simply had to try to live in peace 
side by side with its powerful German neighbor, on the basis of international trea­
ties. But he did not consider Cooperation within the framework of a Central Euro­
pean federation. The latter was being urged by Milan Hodža. In such a case, 
Hodža reasoned, Germany and a group of its smaller neighbor states could coexist 
as equals — „I'm my own master — you're your own master", as the saying 
had it. 
As it turned out, international treaties could, but did not have to, be observed, 
and they could also be brutally violated. In this case they were a poor guarantee 
for Czecho-Slovakia. 
The first shadow falling upon Czechoslovak-German relations was the German 
proposal for a German-Austrian customs union, made in 1931. The International 
Court at the Hague decided (by the majority of a single vote) that such a customs 
union would endanger the independence of Austria and would contradict the stipu-
lations of the peace treaties which prohibited an Anschluss. The samé point of view 
was taken by the signatories of the Geneva Protocol of October 4, 1922: Great 
Britain, France, Italy, and Czecho-Slovakia. 
Until that time, relations between Germany and Czecho-Slovakia had been cor-
rect. But the proposal for a German-Austrian customs union provoked alarm in 
Czecho-Slovakia, mainly because its German circles were at the same time speaking 
of an Anschluss. Was it only an economic question or also, and principally, a poli­
tical one? Hodža said: „Anschluss is not an economic policy but primarily a 
politico-commercial expression of a national policy . . . The Germans work metho-
dically, and their proposed Anschluss would be their crowning achievement, of 
which the well-developed German nation is c a p a b l e . . . We must accept facts as 
they are, we must not lie to ourselves by saying that if we succeed in delaying 
Anschluss today, then that is the end of it 3 8 ." 
Hodza's belief that it was not only an economic matter was borne out by a 
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letter sent on January 20, 1931, by the Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry 
Bülow to the German Ambassador in Washington which reads, in part: „It is 
quite possible that it [the German-Austrian customs union] may lead to political 
conflicts, although we will dress the matter up in a Pan-European cloak (Obwohl 
wir der Angelegenheit ein paneuropäisches Mäntelchen umhängen werden) 3 9 ." 
And then in a letter to the German envoy in Prague, Walter Koch, Bülow States: 
„Once the German-Austrian customs union becomes a reality I believe the pressure 
of economic necessity will compel Czecho-Slovakia within a few years to adhere to 
it too, one way or another. I would regard it as a beginning of a development 
which would be likely to lead to the satisfaction of vital German interest difficult 
to satisfy in other ways . . . 4 0 ." 
And as much as Beneš tried to maintain the post-war order, guaranteed by 
peace treaties, the defeated, but essentially healthy, strong, and industrious Ger­
many continued to grow and gradually started claiming a more important role in 
world politics, while France was living on its laureis in the belief that the Maginot 
line was its impenetrable protective shield. Characteristic of the period of the 
gradual rising of German national selfconsciousness is a letter written by German 
Ambassador in Prague Walter Koch to his ministry in Berlin in 1930 in which he 
justifies the gradually mounting German aversion against BeneŠ as follows: „Ger­
many cannot so easily forget that in all the incidents which have caused the diffi-
culties to the Reich over the last eleven years Beneš had faithfully backed France 
and that he is and always has been the main obstacle, not only to the Anschluss but 
also to a Central European economic alliance under the leadership of Germany 4 I . " 
It would be difficult, in this brief essay, to describc the subsequent development 
of German-Czechoslovak relations. However, it can be said in brief that Beneš 
became the man who „caused the difficulties to the Reich over the last eleven 
years", and who was always without reservation faithful to France. In other 
words a man who with his little State was to play the role of France's policeman 
in Central Europe. 
But no less resolutely did Hodža oppose the Anschluss and German intentions 
to get Central Europe under its control. We have already noted that he thought 
the German-Austrian customs union and the German demand of an Anschluss a 
warning. But unlike Beneš, Hodža did not see security for his country in great 
powers guarantees, pacts, and various agreements. Although at that time he could 
not intervene in matters of foreign policy, he nevertheless often spoke out on it 
within his party organizations. But Beneš was immensely jealous of his commcnts 
on the subject. 
„Then, as a Minister of a rebuilt statě, I had to fight very many of my own 
friends who were too jealous to sacrifice the illusion that small countries placed 
between colossal neighbors would be able to preserve their sovereignty without 
3 9
 B r u e g e 1 : Czechoslovakia before Munich 99. 
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 I b i d e m 100. 
4 1
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establishing a relationship of Cooperation and solidarity among themselves" — 
remarks Hodža, more or less at the address of E. Beneš 4 2. 
We have already mentioned Hodza's Cooperation with representatives of the 
non-Magyar nationalities in Hungary in 1903—1914. And when, in 1919 in Paris, 
Nikola Pašič, Take Ionescu, and Štefan Osuský signed the first common agree-
ment regarding Hungary, they thereby laid the foundation of the Little Entente. 
But by so doing they were not starting to organize an artificial diplomatic struc-
ture. They only put into a new framework the old, proven Cooperation which had 
demonstrated its viability in old Hungary. When on March 14, 1920, Beneš con-
cluded an agreement with Yugoslavia and then on April 23,1921, another one with 
Romania whereby the Little Entente formally came into being, Beneš received 
great credit for this accomplishment. Hodža greeted this event with great pleasure 
but also hastened to note that it meant formal confirmation of „community of 
friendship" whose foundation had been laid already by Michal Miloslav Hodža 
(Milan's uncle) and his collaborators, in the revolutionary year 1848, and by him­
self before the First World War 4 3 . 
The Little Entente became an essential part of the international legal systém 
after World War I. But for Hodža the program of the Little Entente did not 
suffice. Right after its creation Hodža stressed the need for its expansion: „Little 
Entente will fulfil its mission only then when it has all the political and economic 
attributes of a firmly locked-to-gether international group 4 4 . " He was convinced 
that, much as the secession of the non-Magyar nations from old Hungary was 
necessary, it should nevěr have closed the dooř on their past Cooperation. And, 
moreover, they should cooperate with the new Hungary and Austria as well. 
Hodža did not hesitate to say it publicly: „If I were a Magyar boasting the 
favoured central position in the Danube valley, I would not hesitate to call for a 
Conference of representatives of all the new Danubian countries, to be held in Buda­
pest, for the purpose of defining clearly our mutual positions in respect to Coopera­
tion in all those economic matters which should be recognized as constituting a 
common interest 4 5." In Hodza's opinion common defense against Hungary had 
not to be the final goal of Little Entente. Therefore, Hodža welcomed the con-
clusion of treaties between Czecho-Slovakia and Poland and Austria as a good 
basis for the expansion of the Little Entente, and reminded also France, the then 
dosest guarantor of new Czecho-Slovakia, of the importance of such a Central 
European regional entity even for France itself, as well as for the whole of Western 
Europe 4 6 . 
But the Hungarian ultranationalistic circles, stunned by Trianon treaty were 
4 2
 H o d ž a : Federation in Central Europe 6. 
4 3
 H o d ž a : Články IV, 222 f. 
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 Zahraniční politika [Foreign Policy] 1 (1922) No. 1. 
4 5
 Hodza's interview with the editor of the Hungarian economic periodical Pesti Tözade-
Kereskedelmi Lapok, quoted in H o d ž a : Federation in Central Europe 74. 
4 6
 „The French-British agreement, although it can become more cordial, will nevertheless 
always rest on compromise, because Great Britain is also concerned about Germany and 
about lively trade relations with Germany and Russia." (From Hodza's lecture at the 
Société Jétudes exterieures in Paris — quoted from H o d ž a : Články IV, 227.) 
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unable to concentrate on Cooperation for the future. And so, instead of a Danubian 
Cooperation, there came the Hungarian Bolshevik attack against Czecho-Slovakia. 
In March 1919, Count Mihály Károlyi suddenly discovered that he was unable 
to continue maintaining the balance between Hungary's radical bourgeoisie on 
one hand, and the Communist-oriented working class on the other. Here we must 
note that the peasants, a stabilizing element in the Danubian countries, had been 
too badly neglected by the aristocracy to assert themselves at the critical moment. 
Thus Budapest was taken over by the Bolsheviks in March 1919, and they were 
supported by workers who thought themselves oppressed by the ancien regime. 
Did they také over the government? Not exactly. In February 1919, Quai 
D'Orsay was informed by the Budapest government that West European indiffe-
rence to the mutilation of Hungary had forced the Budapest government to open 
the dooř to the big power to the east. This experiment, or rather this revenge of 
Károlyi on the West, ended tragically for the count himself. In the end, he had 
to flee the Bolsheviks. He and his wife found refuge in Prague where the Czecho-
Slovak government treated them in a friendly manner. Károlyi had been the 
wealthiest nobleman in Hungary. But his lands were confiscated by the „new 
ruling class". He finally went overseas to lecture. 
Conditions in Hungary later improved, but the nationalistic feelings of Central 
European countries were then at their peak and they were probably also the reason 
why the Central European countries did not make use even of those advantages 
which were given them by the peace treaties: commercial preferences for five years; 
the St. Germain peace treaty in article 222, the Trianon peace treaty in article 205. 
In those chaotic conditions after the war, Hodža arrived in Budapest to secure 
the departure of Magyar troops from Slovakia. As a practical and flexible politi-
cian, mindful of the fact that the Czecho-Slovak statě could not defend itself mili­
tary, Hodža intentionally protracted the negotiations. At times he even tacti-
cally retreated. Knowing he was more familiär with the Magyar mentality than 
anyone in Prague, he acted rather independently and often ignored his instructions 
from his government which was far away from the scene. He was concerned lest 
the relatively strong Magyar army on Slovák territory commit blodshed. His nego­
tiations and tactical manoeuvers stirred controversy in Prague, but owing to his 
negotiations the Magyar troops were recalled from nine tenths of Slovák territory. 
Those in Prague who were not familiär with these conditions, often reproached 
him for his attitude and criticized him. Naturally, it was first of all Foreign Mini­
ster Beneš who was then still negotiating Czecho-Slovakia's statehood at the 
peace Conferences and from that position was no doubt scrutinizing the man who, 
as he must have known, already long before the war had been building a political 
bloc from the non-Magyar nationalities in Central Europe. Was it again somebody 
from among the Slovaks interfering with matters which he considered his own 
domain 47? 
General J a n i n , Maurice: Moje účast na Československém boji za Svobodu [My 
Participation in Czechoslovak Struggle for Freedom]. Prague 1928, p. 125, writes that 
Dr. Milan R. Štefanik laid a claim to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. But Ma­
saryk gave it already in exile to Beneš and named Štefanik Minister of War. Close 
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Beneš was not mistaken. Hodža really did intervene in Czecho-Slovak foreign 
policy. He did not do so directly, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but 
mostly through international agricultural organizations which became, in Central 
Europe and even in some states in the west, Hodza's base for organizing economic 
and political Cooperation between their states. 
As already mentioned, Hodža had proposed in a Hungarian newspaper right 
after the birth of Czecho-Slovakia, the convening of a Conference of the Danubian 
states including Hungary and Austria. He repeatedly stressed the need for trade 
Conferences of the Little Entente states and states connected with them, Austria, 
Hungary, and especially Poland. Most of all, he stressed that, as far as he could 
see, there was no reason why Czecho-Slovakia could not establish as close ties to 
Poland as possible. Hodža emphasized that foreign policy could not bé just offi-
cial or only artificial. (This no doubt was aimed at Beneš.) Foreign policy, accord­
ing to Hodža, had to follow equally from common interests and from common 
moral and social aspirations of the peoples within the individual states. (Beneš 
rarely observed the life of the peoples within his own country. Mostly he did so 
from abroad. This had to manifest itself as a shortcoming in his foreign policy.) 
There are certain forces operating within nations which can unite but also divide 
them, for example nationalism, religion and church politics, sometimes socialism, 
and so on. Hodža did not discern in the postwar years any signs that any of these 
forces could contribute to the advancement of his idea of international solidarity 
between the Baltic and the Adriatic. But he saw a really homogeneous ideological 
current in agrarism which had already proved its power in narrowing some of the 
gaps and could lead to mutual understanding between peasants of all the states of 
Central Europe. Thus after the Bulgarian negotiations of Stambulijski with Yugo-
slavia, Hodza's visit in Warsaw in 1925 (he was then Minister of Agriculture) 
brought about the settlement of some customs-political disputes. In a speech before 
deputies and Senators of the Polish party Piast on June 21, 1925, Hodža said: „We 
would not acquit ourselves well before the tribunál of history, if we were to fritter 
away just this decisive time of our freedom with quarreis and controversy and 
were not to clear away from the path of our nations all that which still forms an 
obstacle to their cordial mutual understanding 4 8 ." 
At the all-state congress of the Republican (Agrarian) Party in Prague on Sep­
tember 5—6, 1925, Hodža quite openly expressed his opinion on Czecho-Slovak 
foreign policy, basing his right to do so on his function as Minister of Agriculture 
because „the peasants of our statě are united in their views on certain questions 
which move the world". 
to the end of the war Štefanik — already a French generál — did not get on well 
with Beneš, and Masaryk in one letter he sent to Beneš from Prague to Paris, even 
asked: „What should be done with him?" — meaning Štefanik. Sad fate freed them 
of this worry. General Štefanik perished in an air crash while returning to his native 
country, on May 4, 1919, in the neighborhood of Vajnory (near Bratislava). — It is 
evident that also Hodza's ambition was to become Foreign Minister. , 
Slovenský denník (Slovák Daily) 8 (1925) No. 142, June 26. 
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He delivered his speech at a time when the Treaty of Locarno was in a prepa-
ratory stage, a treaty which he did not consider to be a sufficient guarantee of 
peace 4 9 . And at the samé agrarian congress Hodža reminded Beneš, not ex-
pressly but indirectly, that „a realistic politician must reckon with the fact that 
real security for a statě is only that one which is based on its own moral and mate­
riál strength, that our real guarantee is not in a written treaty, a signed piece of 
páper, but in a firm, unshakeable community of all those who have the samé inter-
ests as we h a v e . . . Therefore I believe that the main direction of our policy — 
apart from the spirit of all the Geneva protocols — must be to give our formal 
agreements a soul, a content, so that they will not remain an empty slogan and a 
word, but that solidarity of the small nations from the Baltic to Aegean sea be-
comes a fact and is resolutely expressed also in international politics. With this soli­
darity we shall be strong enough to defend ourselves against oncoming shocks, be 
they Bolshevik or imperialist, which threaten peace 6 0 ." 
Hodža based his idea of a Central European federation on the common inter-
ests of the peasant classes of all nations of Central Europe and their close Coope­
ration with workers and artisans. We must not forget that at that time the popu­
lation of Czecho-Slovakia and Austria was up to 40 °/o agricultural, Hungary 56 °/o, 
and the population of the other states in this area was as much as 70 °/o or more 
agricultural. Hodža was building a common movement which he named „peasant 
democracy", because he wanted to create from the peasantry a middle class that in 
dcveloped countries is the foundation of democracy. 
The idea that what an individual cannot accomplish by himself can be accom-
plished by several individuals in a cooperative, Hodža also transplanted into his 
Central European policies. The little states deluded themselves if they thought 
they would be able to stand up for long to big powers' pressure. Divided, they 
were wasting their strength and defending their bare lives, — in vain. United, they 
could dcal with the great powers as equals according to the saying „I'm my own 
master, you're your own master". But Hodža was careful to emphasize the 
necessity to cooperate on friendly terms with Germany and Russia, as well as with 
England, France, and America. 
The official Agrarian Bloc of six Central European countries could not fail to 
attract the attention of European statesmen; Poland, Hungary, Romania, Yugo-
slavia, Bulgaria, and Czecho-Slovakia together were a bloc of nearly one hundred 
million people. N o political thinker could underrate this possible new factor. With 
Austria and Greece, it might have been a geographic unit of over 110 million in-
habitants. 
Whenever Hodža spoke of a Central European federation he always stressed 
Cooperation with Germany, on the basis of equality. He nevěr made a secret of 
4 9
 Š. Osuský in his speech at the tenth anniversary of Hodza's death, on June 24, 1954, 
said in New York that Hodža „was against the Locarno Treaty". 
5 0
 H o d ž a : Články IV, 348—350. 
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believing with Palacký (and also with latter-day Masaryk), that „a Russian poli-
tical domination of Central Europe would be a crime against civilization" 51. 
The idea of Cooperation took different shapes in different areas of Central 
Europe. One, as already mentioned, was the Little Entente. Another was the idea of 
a customs union of Germany, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, and Hungary. This was 
publicized by Austrian economists. At the Geneva Conference in February and 
March of 1930, five agrarian states of Central Europe concluded an agreement. 
There followed several agrarian Conferences and German publicists started to ad-
vertise the project of a commercial and political drawing together of Germany, 
Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia. Germany did not 
limit itself just to urging it. It made a formal offer of preferential treatment to 
Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia. Then came the agrarian Conference in Paris, 
where France countered by offering preferential treatment to Hungary, Romania, 
and Yugoslavia. Hodža saw in the German offer a move for a political Mittel-
europa under German leadership. He again rejected any hegemony in Central 
Europe, and offered just Cooperation. 
Later Hodža repeated that Czecho-Slovakia was willing to agree upon prin-
ciples and practice of a Central European policy with both parties to the „Róme 
Protocol". On January 17,1936 52, he had a conversation with Austrian Chan-
cellor Kurt Schuschnigg, who promised to be an intermediary between Prague and 
Budapest. On April 2,1936, a new commercial agreement was concluded between 
Czecho-Slovakia and Austria. On February 20, 1936, Hodža negotiated in a 
friendly atmosphere in Beigrade. In Róme and Berlin Hodza's offerts to unify 
Central Europe evoked agitation. But Hodža did not give up. He knew that time 
was running short. On July 13, 1936, he hurried to Vienna to find out, two days 
after the conclusion of the Austrian-German egreement, what chances there re-
mainded for Cooperation with Austria. He then had talks with Chancellor Schusch-
nigg and Romanian politician Rudolph Brandsch. On October 21,1936, Hodža 
met in Prague with Schuschnigg's confidant and with minister Marek, in order to 
describe to them once more the main principles of his pian. He then again empha-
sized that his reorganized Central Europe would not be against, but for Cooperation 
with Germany. In September, Hodža won a promise from the Little Entente that 
its economic section would consider in detail the founding of an industrial and 
financial central office for the entire Danubian area; and in December, this pian 
was formally approved. But a November meeting of the Róme bloc took a nega-
tive view of Hodza's plans, and only Schuschnigg emphasized the need for closer 
ties with Czecho-Slovakia. In March 1937, Hodža again met with Schuschnigg. 
But before the meeting he invited the German Ambassador in Prague Ernst Eisen-
lohr, to explain to him again his view of the Central European Situation and of 
51
 Š. Osuský, in a speech delivered in New York on June 24, 1954, on the lOth anni-
versary of Hodza's death. — „Bolsheviks are not on the level of human civilization" 
— said T. G. Masaryk in his Making of State (Quoted from T. G. Masaryk by M a -
c h o t k a , O.: Cornell University. Washington 1950, p. 29). 
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the possibility of Cooperation of a united Central Europe with Germany. When 
Hodža did not find enough understanding in Berlin and Róme, he expressed his 
willingness — at a Bucharest meeting of Prime Ministers of the Little Entente on 
June 17, 1937, — to let Germany and Italy participate in the first stage of the 
talks about Cooperation in Central Europe. They were to receive the guarantee of 
a fair share of Central European trade. But Berlin and Róme turned a deaf ear 
even to this proposal. 
After the meeting of Chancellor Schuschnigg with Hitler on February 12, 1938, 
in Berchtesgaden, tension between Berlin and Vienna reached a peak. Hodža then 
again tried to meet with Schuschnigg. But the latter let him know it would not be 
good time. It might be sensationalized by the press. He also informed Hodža 
he was ready to intervene in Austria against any disturbances. But Schuschnigg was 
unable to carry out his promise to „intervene" against Nazi superior force. On 
March 13, 1938, the Anschluss materialized — Austria became Germany's Ost-
mark. 
• 
When Milan Hodža was prime minister, he briefly also took over the ministry 
of foreign affairs. Štefan Osuský, Czecho-Slovak ambassador in Paris, informed 
him in February 1936 that Hitler had decided to occupy the Rhineland53. Though 
Czecho-Slovakia was not a signatory of the Rhine Pact, Hodža immediately went 
to Paris, and there on February 12, 1936, he met with French government officials 
and told them Czecho-Slovakia would back France all the way if France would 
resist the annexation of the Rhineland. And he promised to spare no efforts to 
make the other members of the Little Entente, Yugoslavia and Romania, také the 
samé stand. French prime minister Albert Sarraut and foreign minister Pierre-
Étienne Flandin replied, however, that there was no need for haste, because Hitler 
would not do anything before the Olympic Games which were scheduled for August 
of that year. 
On March 17,1936, Hitler occupied the Rhineland. France remained passive, 
and thereby gave Hitler time to build the Siegfried line in the Rhineland and thus 
cut off Czecho-Slovakia and Poland from any potential French assistance. 
For Hodža, that was the strongest possible notice he had better put thing in 
order at home: eliminate conflicts between Slovaks and Czechs, between Czechs 
and Sudeten Germans and Subcarpathean Ruthenians. But time was short. What 
had been neglected during the first 15 years of the Rupublic's existence could not 
be rushed through in what little time it had left. And so Hodza's attempt at a 
Europe where France and Germany would coexist with a new Central European 
Federation — a constellation upon which he wanted to build European peace — 
went to naught. Munich destroyed all Hodza's hopes for a federation of Central 
Europe. On the morning of September 22, 1938, eight days before Munich, he resig-
ned from the office of Prime Minister and went into exile, to France by way of 
Switzerland. 
The civil servant government of General Jan Syrový and President Beneš 
53
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received the Munich ultimatum at 2 a. m. on September 30, 1938. And that was 
the end of the Republic. On March 15, 1939, Hitler occupied Bohemia, Moravia 
and Silesia. Slovakia, blackmailed by Hitler's threat he would hand the Slovaks 
over to Hungary, proclaimed Slovák „independence" on the 14th of March 5 4 . 
In exile, E. Beneš and his political followers maliciously accused Hodža of 
having engineered the Munich capitulation; he allegedly had asked the French am­
bassador Delacroix to pressure the Czecho-Slovak government by indicating that 
if Czecho-Slovakia would not accept the Munich Diktat, neither France nor Britain 
would come to its assistance. Hodža denied this accusation at least twice. Once in 
a letter published in Europe Nouvelle (Paris) of October 19, 1938, and then in a 
conversation with J. W. Wheeler-Bennett in 1941. In the end Beneš himself sent 
him a letter of apology on July 17, 1943, in which he wrote: 
„I sent you a message that I had a conversation in Washington with a French 
personality who had been in a position of responsibility at the Quai d'Orsay in 
September 1938, and who gave me some further details about Munich. Among 
other things, he revealed the instructions Delacroix got from Bonnet for the con­
versation he was going to have with you. It turns out you were to be provoked 
into making a statement which would have been used against our Republic and 
which would have served Paris to throw the responsibility for the non-fulfillment 
of the treaty on Prague. The plot did not succeed and the responsibility could not 
have been put on Prague. Berlin was listening to that conversation. It is only right, 
I think, that you should be informed about it, not only because of the differences 
this matter has caused between us, but also because of its importance. The truth 
about Munich is being slowly revealed and one day will be fully known. Wishing 
you a fast recovery I am, sincerely yours, Dr. Eduard Beneš 5 5 ." 
Beneš and Hodža took pains in exile to maintain a correct relationship, at 
least outwardly. But Beneš tried to get rid of Hodža at any cost. One reason 
was their different opinions on the internal structure of Czecho-Slovakia. (Beneš 
was a centralist, Hodža a regionalist and in exile an outspoken autonomist.) But 
the main reason was their different opinions on the post-war structure of Europe. 
Hodža insisted on a Central European federation. Beneš, in the first few years 
after Munich, hesitantly went along with the idea, but later abandoned it because 
the Soviets did not like it. 
5 4
 B r u e g e l : Czechoslovakia before Munich 306. 
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Hodža is in the possession of the author of this study.) 
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In exile Hodža developed his federation plans for Central Europe more fully 
and workcd much more tenaciously for their realization than ever before. In Lon­
don in 1942 he published his book Federation in Central Europe, in part an account 
of his political activity in Austria-Hungary and in Czecho-Slovakia, in part a remi­
niscence about his negotiations for the autonomy of Slovakia and for the settle­
ment of the Sudeten German issue in the most difficult years and months of the 
Republic, — as well as a perfected program for federation of Central Europe. 
Hodža spoke of his plans also in an interview published in the New York Times 
on December 7,1941, right after his arrival in the USA. In this interview he de-
liberated: 
As small nations were falling, one after another, victims of aggression, a lively 
debatě started in the West as to whether it was advisable to safeguard these nations 
a future independent existence. Hodža argued that from the Standpoint of demo­
cratic political philosophy there was only one answer: every nation, whether large, 
or small, has an equal right to live. N o power, however strong, has the right to 
destroy a nation, however small. The democratic principle of the defense of the 
weaker could not be applied only to individuals, it had to be acknowledged also 
in relations between nations. After all, the fate of small nations was only a question 
of justice and human rights. Every nation, large or small, had to be preserved, and 
would be, if it was able to make valuable moral and materiál contributions to 
mankind. Useless nations had not survived the period of the „national revival". 
Useful and capable nations did survive it, and there was no power so strong as to 
destroy them, unless it would physically annihilate them. 
The right to nationhood is of course, one of the tenets of nationalism. But in 
Central Europe, nationalism is generally accompanied by another phenomenon, 
what one might call the democratic idea. Reasons for that might be found in the 
history of Central European nations: the enemies of their freedom and indepen-
dence very often in recent times happened to be also their class enemies, social 
antagonists. Most big landlords and industrialists, the so-called „ruling class", 
belonged to ethnic groups which have for a few past centuries dominated the Cen­
tral European Slavs. They were Austrians and Magyars, and thus were seen both 
as national oppressors and as exploiters. This identity of social conflicts with natio­
nal ones gave birth to self-protective nationalism always dosely tied to a desire 
for a more democratic society. Hence it can be said that at the beginning of the 
Second World War Central European nationalism was already permeated with 
democratic tendencies. 
On December 4, 1943, Ferenz Göngör published in the Hungarian newspaper 
Az Ember in New York an interview with Hodža. In this interview Hodža 
underscored the necessity of strengthening democracy in all Central European 
countries, especially in Hungary. He said: 
„Without democracy the Danubian region will disintegrate and become the 
victim of external intrigues. Democracy ceased to be an internal affair long time 
ago . . . The interest of the people is identical with peace and progress. Only an 
integral democracy is able to exterminate the dictatorial and imperialistic groups 
which linger in the national organism of the countries of Central Europe. — I speak 
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of integral democracy on purpose because democracy must penetrate not only the 
methods and institutions of the representative government but also the social and 
economic affairs of the masses... If democracy is unable to gain strength from the 
economic satisfaction of the people the foliy of demagoguery will prevail. Leťs 
be frank. In 1922, land reform in Hungary was thwarted. The solid Hungarian 
peasant did not become land owner. In consequence, a great danger threatened the 
European community. Bolshevization becomes dangerous when armed with the 
explosive of misery at home. When the fláme catches the Proletariat of one country 
it will not ask for the visa to enter other countries and the whole of Central Europe 
will be in danger . . . Democracy is not an internal affair, but a vital international 
concern common to all of us who do not wish that Europe should die." 
Editor Göngör then told Hodža that in Budapest he was known as an „arch-
enemy of the Russians" and that his (federation) concept was apt „to thwart 
those whose activity could well bring Central Europe under a Russian protecto-
rate". 
Hodža replied: „Thaťs interesting they consider me an arch-enemy of the 
Russians now when once I was reputed there to be a Russophilic, panslavistic trai-
tor. The truth is only that I nevěr was an admirer of the tzarist regime; and today, 
as all through my life, I believe our common destiny and our future can only be 
secure in an honestly democratic Central Europe. While Russia will remain Soviet, 
a Statist socialistic regime, we shall remain democrats . . . Every nation must derive 
its form of government from its psychological and historical predispositions and 
from the social stratification of its people. The Russian form of government is 
autocratic even today though it now has a certain populist c o n t e n t . . . Those specu-
lations about me in Budapest I consider groundless. My thesis is: no spheres of in­
fluence, no protectorates but a cooperative community of sovereign states which 
would discourage attackers, and where the security of individual sovereign states 
would rest on common action and common responsibility. Thus, neither a Russian 
sphere, nor an Anglo-Russian sphere, but a common and indivisible sphere and a 
Cooperation of all." 
Göndör then asked Hodža: „What is your opinion about the Jewish question? 
What do you think of Tuka's, Tiso's, and Mach's terrible persecution of Jews 
and Magyars?" 
Hodža replied: „The allies did not recognize the governments resulting from 
the German occupation and the nazification of Central European countries. This 
means in principle a political and legal continuity of those countries as they existed 
before the war. The so-called Jewish laws were imported by Hitler, and will be 
thrown out with him. As far as Czecho-Slovakia is concerned, there nevěr was a 
Jewish question in our country, and there nevěr will be one. The Slovák names 
you mentioned are interesting in a way. Forgive me if FU teil you now that in 
1910 census all those who bear those names, without an exception, designated 
themselves as Magyars, not Slovaks. It is natural the Magyars will not be over-
joyed to hear this. But it is neither their nor the Slovaks' fault. About half-a-century 
ago, a couple of representatives of the people's party started to damn the Jews. 
But responsible leaders of our people, Hlinka included, knew better than that. 
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Apart from that, there never was an autochthonous anti-Semitism in Slovakia. 
Between 1918 and 1938, Jews had the same legal and political status as everyone 
eise. My own Agrarian Party always had its Jewish section, always ran Jewish 
candidates for offices, and always had at least one Jewish Parliament deputy for 
a given percentage of votes. The same goes for our Social Democratic Party. — 
In the social and economic spheres, the Jews were free to act according to their 
own wishes and capabilities, that is, the way they do in a liberal society. — While 
I was prime minister, I myself took the Czech-Jewish economist Bitterman out of 
the private sector and made him a department head . . . When in the early days 
of our Republic, the Orthodox Jews asked the government for Hebrew schools, 
I agreed without any hesitation. But this, of course, was not due only to my per-
sonal world-view, but to the moral wellsprings of the Czech and Slovák liberal 
attitudes. Political crises naturally cause upheavels and then some of the worst 
elements of a society surface. The Czecho-Slovak débacle was no exception. Cri-
minal, murderous agents from the near-by Vienna had managed to inject the Nazi 
poison already into the atmosphere of the October Slovák Autonomy in Žilina. 
This explains the humiliation and the persecution of Jews in Slovakia. The Nazis 
found some more or less gangsterish allies in every country, and Slovakia was no 
exception. I deliberately say ,was', not ,is', because in the meantime this epidemie 
has been checked, so that now the Jewish policy' is the policy of but a few very 
visible so-called ,statesmen' who will be made responsible for it. Human compassion 
has been awakened and the churches, too, have done their duty. The truth is, too, 
that prisons and concentration camps are füll of humanitarian leaders. The result? 
Our democratic humanitarian instinets will unify us. Czecho-Slovakia will con-
tinue faithfull to its old honest ways." 
Central Europe naturally is, and will always remain, a neighbor of Germany, 
said Hodža, and one had to reckon with it. And this was how this eminent politi-
cal realist saw the future economic relations of an eventual Central European Fede-
ration with Germany: 
„Economic collaboration between the Central European states to the point of 
establishment of a customs union between them so that they could act as one large 
economic unit, means that they could enter into trade relations with neighbouring 
powers on equal foo t ing . . . There is no question of impairing natural economic 
relations with a future Germany incorporated into the framework of the fair 
European economic Cooperation. But what will be achieved is the reintroduction of 
normal trade relations with Germany, relations which are the immediate reflection 
of the wants and needs of consumers." 
When Hitler attacked the Soviet Union and Russia became an ally of the Western 
power, the idea of Central European federation started to lose ground. At the end 
of 1943 and the beginning of 1944, the fortunes of war, after previous victories 
of Hitler, started to turn in favor of the allies. There followed the period of honey-
moon between the Western allies and Russia. The Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement 
of friendship, signed on December 12, 1943, during Benes's visit in Moscow also 
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falls within this period. It was belicved then that Cooperation with the Soviets 
would be possible even after the war. The name of Soviet Russia rang out with 
promise in America. Soviet propaganda was then so effective that it won over the 
hearts of the good-natured Americans. It was then very unpopulär in America to 
say loudly that the Soviets would trample under their feet, right after the war, 
that which they had signed in the Declaration of te United Nations. Anyone's 
warning against the communist imperialistic expansion was considered breaking the 
rules of the game; the Cooperation and unity of the allies, the all-out war effort, 
and the chances of ending the war quickly — that was the aim. 
But Hodža nevěr concealed his deep distrust of communism, and he could hardly 
dissociate Soviet Russia from it. In 1918—1919, he had watched a gradual take-
over by the communists in Hungary. It was his opinion that „you could yield 
power to the communists and help to build up the might of the Soviet Union only 
at the peril of your life and of human civilization 5 6 ." This attitude toward com­
munism Hodža never concealed in his lectures in America and in his articles, and 
even less after Beneš concluded the 1943 Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement. Some 
journalists in America attacked him then — most of all the Overseas News Agency, 
but also some Czech and Slovák newspapers, sympathetic to Benes's pro-Soviet 
policies. The Overseas News Agency wrote that inquiries about Hodža at the 
Czecho-Slovak Legation in Washington were answered in a cold and reserved 
manner, and that „an indication was made to the effect that Hodža was the 
leader of the Agrarian Party which at the decisive m o m e n t . . . took a stand against 
Beneš", and that the Agrarian Party „was only a little less reactionary than the 
fascist party of Hlinka's Guardists, and had made any Opposition to the Munich 
betrayal impossible . . . " 5 7. And the Chicago Sun of August 12, 1942, added the 
following: „The Agrarians were for the Munich P a c t . . . " In a letter dated Sep­
tember Ist, 1942, Hodža wrote to Beneš: „One radio commentator declared 
me to be ,the former pro-Nazi prime minister'. From what he already had con-
fessed to, it is one hundred per cent certain that he had received this ,information' 
from our Legation . . . It is, of course, well known, — and Dr. Papánek had him­
self boasted of it, — that he had denounced me (to the U.S. authorities)5 8." 
Naturally, then, the American authorities were dosely watching Hodža. A 
memorandum submitted to the State Department by DeWitt Poole of the Office 
of Strategie Services (the forerunner of CIA) stated that the „representatives of 
president Beneš in this country headed by Dr. J. Papánek 5 9 , . . . vigorously 
combat Hodza's efforts to win the backing of American Slovaks for his ideas". 
5 6
 During his diplomatic mission in Budapest after the World War I, Hodza's own life 
was endangered by the Hungarian Bolsheviks. See H o d ž a : Federation in Central 
Europe 77, footnote 1. 
5 7
 Věk Rozumu, November 20, 1941. 
5 8
 Photographic copy Hodza's letter to Beneš is in the ownership of the author of this 
study. 
5 9
 Ján Papánek was the Czecho-Slovak consul in Pittsburgh/Pa. and after the Munich 
catastrophy he entered the Service of Beneš, and later he became the head of the 
Czechoslovak Information Service in New York. Czecho-Slovak minister in Washing­
ton/D. C. was Vladimir Hurban. 
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But it also said: „On his arrival in the United States Dr. Hodža immediately be-
came the target of what may be described as a ,smear' campaign. The Overseas 
News Agency described him in press releases as the leader of a reactionary party 
which was not far from being Fascist and in any case was anti-Semitic. It was 
alleged that he maintained close contact with Tibor Eckhardt and the Archduke 
Otto as well with a German military clique. There were also rumors about finan-
cial irregularities in his past, and stories were circulated to publicize his extrava-
gance with funds obtained by peculation, together with accounts of his reputedly 
immoral private life. Dr. Hodža charges that the originator of these rumors was 
Dr. Papánek, acting on Instructions from Beneš in London . . . e 0 . " 
This was a real smear campaign — without quotation marks. Just to illustrate 
„the extravagance with funds obtained by peculation", it would be useful to 
mention this episode: Jaroslav Stránský while in Benes's Service during the 
first Republic accused Hodža in his newspaper Lidové Noviny of bribery and 
peculation in the so-called Koburg-Eisler affair. Hodža sued him and Stránský 
apologized publicly. — Jan Stránský, the son of Jaroslav Stránský, told me in 
New York how Beneš incited his father to attack Hodža, and promised him 
documents that would prove the accusation. When the day of the trial came, it 
turned out Beneš had none. And so Stránský lost the case against Hodža. 
The memorandum also said: „It is known that Dr. Papánek contacted a Chicago 
newspaperman in an effort to keep him from writing anything about Dr. Hodza's 
federation pian on the ground that Hodža was an evil influence sowing discord 
among the Czechs and Slovaks 61. 
But in another memorandum, dated October 1, 1942, the representative of the 
same Office of Strategie Services, De Witt C. Poole, does not mention „an evil 
influence sowing discord among the Czechs and Slovaks"; he writes about a „sup-
port which Dr. Hodža seems to have won in the United States to a considerable 
extent" 62. And it is not without interest that the same DeWitt C. Poole wrote on 
June 30,1951, an exellent program about Hodža for the Radio Free Europe. 
Because of his anti-communist attitude, Hodža was called by some American 
newspapers „Russia-hater-and-baiter". The memorandum quoted in fact, resulted 
from an official investigation of Hodža due to aceusations that he was „inter-
fering with the American war effort". — Such was then the atmosphere in Ame-
rica, and so was received every concept foreseeing the communist danger for 
post-war Europe and future Soviet imperialism. 
After the Teheran Conference of the Big Three and the Treaty of Alliance bet-
ween the Soviet Union and the Czecho-Slovak government in exile, Hodža be-
came alarmed at the implications of the rumoured zones of military administra-
tions or influence allegedly carved out between the allies in the heart of Europe. 
60
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In the winter of 1944, he submitted a long Memorandum to the American Secre-
tary of State Cordell Hüll. There he enumerated all the Soviet aggressions and 
annexations of foreign territories from 1939 on. He warned against the nuclei of 
so-called friendly governments reared in Moscow, i. e. the Poles Kornejcuk-Vasi-
levska, the Bulgarian Dimitroff, the Yugoslav Tito, whose task it was to establish 
communism firmly in their respective countries according to a Kremlin master plan. 
And he admonished against the same danger looming in Asia too. 
A clear evidence of Soviet plans for Europe was the so-called Manifesto of a 
Free Germany, issued in Moscow at that time. This Manifesto was quite openly 
against an unconditional surrender of Germany, a policy proclaimed by the West 
and accepted also by the Soviets. The Manifesto plainly expected Germany to 
accept the so-called „friendly government" in Moscow. 
About the relationship of communism to Russian nationalism Hodža wrote in 
the Memorandum: „It would be dangerous to count on a difference between 
Russian communism and nationalism. Communism has accepted nationalism as the 
most useful emotional dement in the mentality of the masses of the Russian people. 
Russian nationalism can not remain indifferent when overwhelmed by the prospect 
of dominating Central Europe, Slav and non-Slav." 
Further, Hodža tried to persuade Cordell Hüll not to abandon his plan for an 
all-allied military administration of liberated territories and not to allow any-
where an exlusive Soviet one, even temporarily. He states in the Memorandum: 
„Instead of ,spheres of interest' a firm stand must be taken by the Big Three 
on international Cooperation by equal sovereignties, including Joint decisions and 
joint responsibilities. It is only inside the framework that Russia can become a 
partner of the United States and Great Britain now and after the war. Stalin's 
challenge to democracy should be met by all the methods and institutions which 
constitute the prerequisites and weapons of democratic organizations of Europe 
immediately after the cessation of hostilities. A free expression of the people's will 
must be obtained in all countries, provinces or regions in question, if necessary 
under the Joint protection of the Big Three and possibly their military units. The 
application of the generál principle of democratic proceduře may require special 
methods in some European countries." 
„The free elections and plebiscites in Central Europe" — insisted Hodža in 
the Memorandum — „based on an universal franchise will demonstrate the desire of 
all Central European countries to enjoy the friendship and help of the USA and 
the United Kingdom and also the wish for good neighbourly relations with Rus­
sia — without acceptance, however, of the economic and political systém or of her 
interference with their internal affairs." He pleaded further: „Russia's security 
does not depend on an artificial conquered ,security belt' of neighbouring nations, 
but on international solidarity in the framework of the Big Three and the United 
Nations." 
About Czecho-Slovakia Hodža writes: „It may or may not be true that the 
master of Prague is the master of Europe e 3. At any rate, as the Czecho-Slovak 
6 3
 German Chancellor Otto Bismarck after his victory over Austria in 1866 allegedly 
declared: „Whoever is master of Bohemia is master of Europe. Europe must, there-
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government in exile has entered the Soviet sphere, Prague is going to become 
instrumental in Moscow's communistic Drang nach Westen. A Slav nationalist 
should be enthusiastic about an unheard-of expansion of Slavic thought or sphere 
as far as Prague, a traditional center of Slavic cultural and political efforts. As a 
matter of fact, however, Slavic civilization sprang up and focussed upon ideals 
such as humanitarian democracy, liberties of the individual and the nations and 
freedom of thought and conscience. It was to these ideals that so many Czech 
leaders from Jan Hus, Comenius, Palacký, up to T. G. Masaryk dedicated them­
selves. Moscow's Slavism may be fundamentally different. Slav romanticism was 
being ušed for propaganda purposes by some of the Tsar's diplomats. So it is 
now . . . It is however, precisely the history of the Slav nations that offers the most 
tragic evidence against the division of Europe into spheres of interests. Poles and 
Czechs and Slovaks and all Yugoslavs have been victims of the power-and-spheres 
policies for centuries. So it was with satisfaction and indeed enthusiasm that all 
these nations, except the Czechs in exile, hailed the post-war scheme of international 
Organization based upon equal sovereignties of all nations large and smal l . . . 
Mr. Beneš however publicly made an attempt to explain his special-sphere policy 
by indicting the western democracies for the betrayal of which Czecho-Slovakia 
became the victim in 1938. In fact, it was Mr. Beneš himself who during his long 
personal experience with the League of Nations could not fail to learn the object 
lesson that no special betrayal was needed to let down our country in 1938. It 
certainly was the absence of European solidarity against aggression that ripened a 
violent revival of German imperialism . . . There was an inadequate systém which 
had become a hot-bed of those wicked and which carried by itself the elements of 
divisions and conflicts. It is not only the French sphere that was doomed to dissolve 
into thin air, influential as France might have been in 1919. N o sphere is strong 
enough to silence the rest of the world, or even only the rival's sphere. Small na­
tions did not succeed in being protected by France and they will not enjoy their 
protection by Soviet Russia in spite of the magnificence of Russian achievement... 
Final victory means collective victory, collective war aims, and unconditional 
loyalty and disciplině. — I am sorry to point out that official Czecho-Slovak 
policy obviously relinquished this imperative requirement of all a l l ies ' . . . " 
Then in Chapter IV of the Memorandum Hodža asks whether Beneš was 
entitled „to help the Soviets in creating a sphere, a .security belt' in single-handed 
action, outside the framework of the Big Three". „Formally, he was" — ans-
wered Hodža — but he disputed Benes's „right to commit our people and the 
State to any fundamental internal or international issues." 
From what Hodža wrote in the Memorandum, it is clear that he was seriously 
alarmed at the prospect of communism swallowing up the whole of Central Europe. 
fore, never allow any nation except the Czechs to rule it, since that nation does not lust 
for domination. The bounderies of Bohemia are a safeguard of European security and 
he who moves them will plunge Europe into misery." ( B e n e š , E.: Address to the 
Congress of the United States, May 13, 1943. Published in: Czechoslovak Sources and 




He considered it a most gloomy prospect from the point of view of his country, 
but also very much against the interests of stable, law-abiding forces in Europe, 
pitted against the danger of communist expansion and dynamism. The old „Euro­
pean concert", the balance of power and the principle of compensating any great 
power for territorial aggrandizements of another great power in Europe, were 
long ago discarded as absolete. Hodža wanted to maintain the Central European 
area free, in order to federate it and thus to recreate a balance of power on the 
European continent which would prevent Soviet Russia from over-running it. — 
Unfortunately he did not succeed. And dying on June 27, 1944, he could not yet 
see all that caused his fears and apprehensions materializing all over Central Eu­
rope. But the fact is that he was a European statesman of great vision. 
Hodža concluded his Memorandum by the words which are still a memento 
for the world: „Without a free Central Europe there is no prospect of preventing 
a totalitarian imperialism from engulfing all of Europe and, maybe, even some 
of its neighbours overseas." (What a resemblance with the alleged Bismarck dic­
tum of 1866!— See footnote 63.) 
Political representatives of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland in exile agreed in 1940 
on a close Cooperation. This was to a large extent due to the Milan Hodza's old 
connections and cooperations with his Polish Agrarian friends. They agreed to 
create a real Polish-Czechoslovak union, in the hope that other Central European 
nations would also join it. Hardly anybody eise rejoiced at this agreement as much 
as Hodža. — „What I wish to emphasize is that the Union of Poland and Czecho-
Slovakia is to be assessed as the steping-stone to a federated Central Europe", said 
Hodža, and, stressing once again an all-Central European union, he went on: 
„This war would be an irreparable loss for mankind if it were not recompensed 
by materiál guarantees for adapting national aspirations, aggressive as they are. 
Victory means also consolidation of its results 6 4 ." The final declaration of the 
Polish-Czechoslovak confederation was signed on January 21, 1942, in London. 
In the years that immediately followed Munich, even Beneš began to realize the 
weakness of the small countries that had come out of World War I. He admitted it 
openly in his speech to the Czechoslovak State Council in London on December 11, 
1940, when he condemned the Wesťs unwillingness „to defend the international 
legal systém of Europe" and the concessions that were being made to dictatorships 
„mostly at the expense of small countries" 6 5. In fact, already in August 1939, he 
said in a message he sent from London to Prague: „We desire order, unity, and 
we intend to come to terms even with Poland and to cooperate loyally with it now 
that we are fighting on the same front 6 6 ." And later, speaking to the home front 
over rádio from London, he said: „We want above all to continue our current 
Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations . . . In these preparatory arrangements we are 
leaving the dooř open to other Middle-Eurpean countries to embark upon a com-
6 4
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Týdeník Čechoslovák [Weekly Čechoslovák]. London 1942, p. 115. 
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mon road with us 6 7." In May 1941, before the Council on Foreign Relations in 
Chicago, he said: „To my mind the idea of confederation is a sound and fruitful 
idea for the nations of the European continent. The members of our government 
believe, too, that our confederation with Poland will benefit our Polish neighbors 
no less than ourselves , 8 . " 
But immediately after that, in December 1943 on his visit to Moscow, he apolo-
gized for the Czechoslovak-Polish Declaration in the talk with Molotov saying 
that he signed it under pressure of the British, so as to get their recognition of his 
government in exile. „We needed recognition from the British, but they laid down 
a condition, we shall not recognize you, if you do not come to an understanding 
with the Poles. They pressed for a federation. The Poles too. Under this pressure 
we negotiated and I refused categorically from the beginning to accept a federa­
tion", explained Beneš to Molotov, and added: „It will not be a federation, at 
most it can be a confederation . . . it will be a confederation sui generis". And 
when Molotov asked him what a confederation sui generis was, Beneš readily 
replied: „I did not want it to be talked about as simply a confederation, because 
that has a certain connotation in international l a w . . . That is why I added that 
between us and the Poles it was going to be a confederation of a special kind, sui 
generis, the nature of which had to be determined in further negotiations 6 9 ." 
For those negotiations Beneš laid down further conditions: „a/ There shall be 
nothing between us and Poland, if there will not be friendly relations between 
Poland and the USSR; or b/ if border issue between ourselves will not be resolved 
in a friendly way; c/ there will be no confederation if there is no basic change in 
all internal conditions in Poland; d/ I shall not sign anything outside our borders, 
we can only discuss matters, only the nation at home can dicide 7 0 ." (It is certainly 
interesting that while telling Molotov, that „only the nation can decide", he was 
signing a treaty with Soviet Russia without asking the nation's permission.) 
But Molotov remarked that the Soviets were mainly against the Declaration of 
January 21, 1942. Beneš simply declared: „As of today, it is null and void. We 
said to ourselves that we were stopping the work, and I told Mikolajczyk that I did 
not consider myself bound by this declaration . . . I told all that also to the British. 
Now our agreement [Soviet-Czechoslovak] means that all that was agreed upon 
about the confederation is no more valid 7 1 ." 
But in this conversation with Molotov Beneš tried to go even further to meet 
the Soviets. To avoid any suspicion that Czecho-Slovakia might be considering a 
Danubian, ar Central European federation, that is an attempt to realize Hodza's 
plans, Beneš took a very clear stand regarding this question: „I should like to 
mention the Danubian federation and assure you that in this respect we have under-
taken no commitments, nor shall we do so; a/ In questions of organizing Central 
Europe we shall do nothing without agreement with you; b/ We are for the inde-
6 7
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9* 
pendence of Austria, and we are convinced that Austria can live by itself. . . 7 2 . " 
Beneš fatally undercut Czecho-Slovakia's Cooperation with Poland and the 
envisioned Central European federation. Professor Vojtěch Mastný wrote that 
„the president knew exactly what he was doing and, at least in that his actions 
were always perfectly thought through, he was an equal of Stalin" 7 3. And Benes's 
chancellor Jaromír Smutný simply called Beneš „the greatest Machiavelli of 
our time" 7 4. 
We have already mentioned the pro-Soviet mood in America after Hitler's 
sudden attack on Soviet Russia. Some American journalists called Hodža a „Rus-
sia-hater-and-baiter" and often viciously attacked him. But it certainly cannot be 
said that all of America became uncritical vis-á-vis the Soviets. Its suspicions of 
communism and its N o . I. representative, the Soviet Union, were just temporarily 
restrained. 
The great majority remainded cautious and reserved. Even in government circles, 
opinions were divided. For the ailing president F. D. Roosevelt it was easier and 
more comfortable to trust, rather than not to trust, Stalin. The Secretary of State, 
Cordell Hulí, was more cautious. The same was true of his assistant Secretary 
Adolph Berle, Jr. — on the other hand, undersecretary, Sumner Welles, was a 
typical representative of the conciliatory policy toward the Soviets. (This was not 
out of any sympathy for communism or the Soviet systém on his part, but simply 
because the USSR was an ally.) The main thing was to end the war as quickly as 
possible and, as is always the case in any war, to bring the American soldiers back 
home as soon as possible. 
I t is certainly worth notice that on August 10, 1943, just before the meeting of 
F. D. Roosevelt with Churchill in Quebec, the former American ambassador in 
Moscow William C. Bullitt sent President Roosevelt a 14-page memorandum in 
which he suggested the allies should open a European front in the Balkans and thus 
prevent the Soviets from entering Central Europe. „Stalin, like Hitler, will not 
stop, he can only be stopped" — Bullitt warned Roosevelt, and he added: „our 
political objectives would be the establishment of British and American forces in 
the Balkans and Eastern and Central Europe. Their first objective should be the 
defeat of Germany, the second, the barring to the Red army of the way into 
Europe 7 5 . " 
Sober voices in America and elsewhere in the West saw no good omen in Benes's 
1943 trip to Moscow. Some political thinkers and writers held to Soviet-Czecho-
slovak agreement to be an invitation to the Soviets to enter Europe 7 6. The British 
government tried for a long time to dissuade him from making the trip, and in 
America, where he went in summer 1943,— that is long before his departure for 
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Moscow — he evidently did not get a clear-cut approval either 7 7. The fact is, 
though, that during his talks with representatives of the USA in Washington Beneš 
made no effort to win any promises that America and the Western allies would be 
directed toward uniting the Central European micro-states. Benes's trip to Mos­
cow, and the commitments he made there on the behalf of future Czecho-Slovakia, 
were a death-blow to Hodza's federation plans, as well as to the plans of the 
Polish government in London. 
There are moments in life that one never forgets. One of such moments in my 
life was when I visited Hodža just after Beneš and the Czecho-Slovak govern­
ment in exile declared publicly that the security of Czecho-Slovakia was to be 
based on the dosest possible Cooperation with the Soviet Union. Never before had 
I seen Hodža so downcast. Hodza's fears were confirmed also by the secret 
despatch sent to Beneš in London by the head of the Czechoslovak Information 
Service in New York Ján Papánek, in which he described the meeting of DeWitt 
Poole of the American Office of Strategie Services with Hodža. When Poole 
asked Hodža if he would not go to London, Hodža answered no . . . saying that 
he „does not agree with Benes's policy, especially vis-á-vis the Soviet Union" 7 8. 
True, the Soviets were then posing before the Western world as democrats, they 
had even disbanded the Comintern and were promising friendly Cooperation after 
the war. But Milan Hodža did not trust them and, though discouraged by this 
turn of events, did not stop warning of the Soviet danger. This was the time when 
he wrote the above mentioned Memorandum to the State Department, which will 
always remain a testimony to Hodza's far-reaching statesmanlike vision. 
Milan Hodža wrote, and many times also said, that he had dedicated his whole 
life to the effort of unifying the nations of Central Europe. What a long life? 
He was born in Sučany (near Turčiansky Svatý Martin) in Slovakia on Fe­
bruary 1,1878, and died on June 27, 1944, in Clearwater, Florida, USA, in exile. 
He was born to Ondřej Hodža, a Lutheran pastor in Sučany, and his second wife 
Maria Plechová. Milan's father was among the literary followers of L'udovit 
Štúr, and his uncle, Michal Miloslav Hodža, also a Lutheran pastor (in Liptovský 
Svatý Mikuláš), was one of the most steadfast defenders of the Slovák literary 
language in the 1840's. He was also one of those who sought from the Emperor 
equality for all nations in the Austrian Empire, in other words, a federation. 
Francis Joseph promised a lot of things to the Slovaks and even donated 1,000 
Guilders for the founding of Matica Slovenská, a Slovák cultural Organization, 
but after the settlement with the Magyars in 1867 he „swallowed his promises", as 
Hodža ušed to say, „just like oysters before lunch". Thus the idea of a federation 
as proposed by František Palacký at the Kremsier Diet in 1849, in which Slovaks 
and Czechs were to form a single Czecho-Slovak statě, feil through. 
7 7
 „After talking to Roosevelt and to those at State Department he (Beneš) told me that 
opinions at the State Department were divided, but that Roosevelt had no objections", 
wrote Ján P a p á n e k in the review: Proměny 13 (1976) No. 4, 34. 
7 8
 O t á h a l o v á , Libuše / Č e r v i n k o v á , Milada (eds.): Dokumenty z československé 
politiky, 1939—1943. 2 Vols. Prague 1966, here vol. 1, p. 392. 
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And so, the son of that Ondřej Hodža and nephew of Michal, rcpaid His Majesty 
for those „swallowed oysters" in one of his harshest articles entitled Again at the 
Expense of Our Hides, Your Majesty 79? in which he asked Slovakia not to rely 
upon the dynasty, but „upon the strength of the nation a n d . . . an alliance with 
all parties which honestly desire generál suffrage". That was Hodza's prepara-
tion for an alliance of non-Magyar parties with Magyar democratic and socialist 
parties, which came into being in 1906—1908. Hodža tried to realize the Fede­
ration hopes of his forefathers; and his own efforts can be divided into three 
periods: 
1./ 1903—1914. — In this period Hodza's aim was, to democratize Hungary 
through universal suffrage, land reform, and an equal status for the non-Magyar 
nationalities which outnumbered the Magyars. To that end he started to cooperate 
very dosely with the Romanians, Serbs, and democratic Germans, as well as with 
the democratic Magyars in Hungary. From the equality status for all the nationali­
ties in Hungary, and in the entire Habsburg monarchy, Hodža expected a total 
restructuring of the Empire: it would necessarily become a federation, though 
temporarily one ruled by a strong monarch and thus something similar to what 
František Palacký had proposed. That was why Hodža and some of his Slovák 
confrěres started talking to the successor to the throne Francis Ferdinand who 
wanted to tarne the Separatist dualism of the Magyars and whom Hodža and his 
Romanian and Serbian fellow-participants in these contacts expected to put the 
monarchy on a federal foundation. But the sudden death of Francis Ferdinand 
clearly signalled to Hodža: Now war is coming. Austria-Hungary will fall apart 
and on its ruins a „Commonwealth of liberated nations" will be created. During 
the First World War, between 1915—18, Hodža undoubtedly planned with Czechs 
in Vienna, — in secret, of course, — a common statě of the Czechs and the Slovaks. 
2.1 The period of 1918—1938. Although Hodža had only few opportunities 
to influence directly the foreign policy of Czecho-Slovakia, he ušed powerful agrar­
ian organizations to urge the formation a Central European federation, which 
might include Austria and Hungary, and to call for the closest possible union with 
Poland. He did not believe in the great power guarantees. Nor did he believe in 
the Treaty of Locarno. He trusted only Central European seif-help. And he es-
pecially did not want Czecho-Slovakia to act as policemen for any power in Central 
Europe. He thought that only a united Central Europe could act as an economically 
and politically equal partner of both the neighboring and the distant great powers. 
When the German-Austrian customs union was formed, and the Anschluss an-
nounced, Hodža began to negotiate feverishly for the unification of Central 
Europe. He tried to correct what the Versailles Treaties had neglected to point out 
to the nations of the area. Námely: You are free. You have your own states, small 
states. But you must unitě, you must form a federation which would be able to resist 
pressure from whatever direction. But it was too late. Hitler's armies were already 
on the march. 
Slovenský týždenník 3 (1905) No. 28, July 7. — Here Hodža protested against the 
Habsburg-Hungarian reconciliation then being negotiated. 
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3./ During World War II Milan Hodža expanded his concept, as well as the 
area of a potential Central European federation. He then spoke not only of the 
states of the Little Entente, and Austria, Hungary, and Poland, but added the 
Baltic states, and quite logically also Bulgaria and Greece. The federation was to 
be located between Germany and Russia, and between the Baltic and the Aegean 
seas. British politicians understood Hodza's concept. They pressed Benes's 
government in exile to start forming a federation, first with Poland and then to 
go on from there. America, although itself a federation, did not quite understand 
the importance of such a formation in Central Europe. It was no longer the era of 
Woodrow Wilson who knew precisdy what Central Europe needed and who, like 
Lincoln, believed in the principle „E pluribus unum." One can call it an era when 
the United States succumbed to Soviet blundishments and friendly smiles. In spite 
of his failing health, Hodža made a great effort to convince the shapers of foreign 
policy in America that Stalin was not to be allowed to enter Europe. He explained 
very clearly why in his extensive Memorandum, but to no avail. 
Perhaps the Almighty was merciful to Hodža in not letting him see what was 
happened Europe after the war. What befell his native country and the whole of 
Central Europe was exactly what he had warned the Western democracies against, 
but without success. 
Cordell Hüll, American Secretary of State during World War II, apparently 
just put Hodza's Memorandum (about the Soviet threat to Europe and the 
world) in his drawer. President F. D. Roosevelt left in his own drawer a similar 
warning from his own ambassador and friend W. C. Bullitt. Such were the times. 
Only Joseph Stalin was smiling under his moustache, waited, — and lived to see 
his plans realized. Not until ten years after Hodza's death came another Secre-
tary of State, the wise and farseeing John Foster Dulles, who did Hodža justice. 
Dulles wrote about him: „He was a statesman whose practical understanding of 
the interdependence of nations was far ahead of his time. He is being honored for 
his constructive contribution to the cause of European unity and international 
understanding. May his wisdom for a union of sovereign and equal peoples in free 
association for mutual security and greater prosperity continue to inspire freedom-
loving men on both sides of the Iron Curtain 80." 
What a tragédy that an American Secretary of State came to understand this 
only ten years after Hodza's death! 
M I L A N H O D Ž A S B E M Ü H U N G E N 
U M D I E M I T T E L E U R O P Ä I S C H E F Ö D E R A T I O N 
Ihre ersten Impulse bekamen die föderalistischen Bestrebungen Hodžas in der 
Zeit seines Studiums am deutschen Gymnasium in der siebenbürgischen Stadt Herr-
80
 John Foster Dulles on the lOth anniversary of Hodza's death (New York, June 24, 
1954). 
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mannstadt (Sibiu). Dort knüpfte er eine dauerhafte Freundschaft mit mehreren 
Mitschülern rumänischer, serbischer und deutscher Nationalität. Später gründete 
Hodža mit einigen von ihnen — z. B. mit Michael Popovici und Ilario Chendi — 
einen Verein nichtungarischer Studenten an der Budapester Universität. Sie be-
kundeten schon im Jahre 1897 in einem Vereins-Beschluß die Absicht, ein gemein-
sames Aktionsprogramm auszuarbeiten, das die Verbesserung des Loses der nicht-
ungarischen Völker Ungarns zum Ziel hatte. Man kann die föderativen Bestrebun-
gen Hodžas in drei Zeitabschnitte einteilen: 
1. 1903—1914. Vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg sah Hodža sein politisches Ziel im 
demokratischen Umbau Ungarns, der in enger Zusammenarbeit mit den Rumänen, 
Serben, Deutschen und auch den demokratisch gesinnten Ungarn erfolgen sollte. 
Die Durchführung des allgemeinen Wahlrechtes, die Agrarreform und die recht-
liche Gleichstellung aller Nationalitäten schienen ihm geeignete Mittel zu sein, 
dieses Ziel zu erreichen. Die föderalistische Neuordnung sollte diese Bestrebungen 
krönen und die Lösung der nationalen Probleme nicht nur in Ungarn, sondern in 
der ganzen Monarchie ermöglichen. Diese Vorstellungen beflügelten Hodža, als 
er der Einladung von Erzherzog Franz-Ferdinand folgte. Der Thronfolger war 
durch den ungarischen Separatismus beunruhigt und Hodža hegte die Hoffnung, 
daß er Verständnis für die Belange der unterdrückten Nationalitäten in Ungarn 
zeigen werde. Die Ermordung Franz-Ferdinands und der Erste Weltkrieg machten 
Hodžas Bestrebungen gegenstandslos. 
2. 1918—1938. Zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen hatte Hodža keinen direkten 
Zutritt zur auswärtigen Politik der Tschechoslowakischen Republik. Er bemühte 
sich, seine föderalistischen Vorstellungen auf der Ebene der internationalen Agrar-
bewegung zu fördern und zwar insbesondere in den Staaten der „Kleinen Entente". 
Er mißtraute dem Vertragssystem mit den westlichen Demokratien, das die Grund-
lage der tschechoslowakischen Außenpolitik bildete. Er wollte das mitteleuropäische 
Macht-Vakuum durch eine Föderation derjenigen Staaten füllen, die in diesen 
Raum gehörten, und die durch gemeinsame politische Interessen verbunden waren. 
In den bäuerlichen Schichten, die im mitteleuropäischen Raum lebten, sah er einen 
wichtigen Träger vieler ökonomischer und gesellschaftlicher Gemeinsamkeiten. 
3. Der Zweite Weltkrieg. Während der Zeit des politischen Exils in den Ver-
einigten Staaten verbreitete Hodža seine Raumvorstellungen von der mittel-
europäischen Föderation. Nicht nur die Staaten der „Kleinen Entente", Öster-
reich, Ungarn und Polen, sondern auch die baltischen Nationen, die Bulgaren und 
Griechen sollten in die gemeinsame Föderation einbezogen werden. Hodža unter-
stützte die Initiative zur Bildung eines tschechoslowakisch-polnischen Bundesstaates 
und kritisierte Benešs Politik der engen Allianz mit der Sowjetunion, die den 
föderalistischen Bestrebungen zuwider war. Seine Vorstellungen erläuterte Hodža 
im Buch Federation in Central Europe und in dem langen Memorandum an das 
amerikanische Auswärtige Amt, in dem er vor dem sowjetischen „Drang nach 
Westen" warnte. 
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